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ABSTRACT. 
Tht? New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 has now been enacted for ten years. Most of 
the focus on the act has been on the vindication of rights in the area of criminal law. Far 
from being just about the criminal law, rights and freedoms are also affirmed and 
vindicated in the civil courts. 
There has been limited discussion so far on the potential of the Bill of Rights Act in non-
criminal cases. This paper will analyse significant non-criminal cases with constructive 
and critical comment made where appropriate. Addressing the misperception that the Bill 
of Rights is confined to the criminal law is one of the aims of this paper. Explanation of 
significant cases that have profound effects on New Zealand society will be explored. 
The Bill of Rights is still only in its infancy, and its potential is yet to be tapped. This 
paper will go some way towards tapping some of it. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 13, 563 words. 
I. 
Human rights are better perceived as prerequisites to the rule of law and, as such, part of the 
constitutional fabric, which underpins the working of democracy. It is in this fashion that they 
have found their way into this country's Bill of Rights. The affirmed rights thus obtain an intrinsic 
value because the community has chosen to vest them with that value. It is a value, which is 
realised in the individual case when a person is deprived of that right.
1 
- Justice E.W. Thomas, New Zealand Court of Appeal. 
Introduction. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
2 recently celebrated its tenth birthday in 
September 2000. In enacting a Bill of Rights New Zealand came into line with many 
other jurisdictions around the world.
3 Bills of Rights around the world protect and 
maintain the Rule of Law, which is of utmost importance in a free and democratic society 
such as New Zealand's. Whence the long title of the BORA affirms New Zealand's 
commitment to the Rule of Law. It states this is an act: 
(a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand; 
and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
These rights and freedoms lie at the heart of any liberal democracy such as New 
Zealand's. The BORA protects all rights and freedoms and they fall into relevant 
categories which include Life and Security of the Person;4 Democratic and Civil rights;5 
1 Dun/ea & Others v Attorney-General [2000] 3 NZLR 136, 159. 
2 Hereafter referred to as the BORA. 
3 In Europe they have the 'European Declaration on Human Rights'; USA has the 'United States 
Constitution' which incorporates a Bill of Rights; and Canada has the 'Canadian Charter on Rights and 
Freedoms'. Australia has no Bill of Rights and relies on the common law. South Africa has a constitution 
passed in 1993 and the United Kingdom has also passed the Human Rights Act 1999. 
4 Sections 8-11 BORA. 
5 Sections 12-18 BORA. 
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Non-Discrimination and Minority rights;
6 and rights of Search, Arrest and Detention. 
7 
It 
specifically left out rights that can be grouped under economic or social rights. 
8 
The BORA was a long time in the making, it first being introduced to the country 
and Parliament in 1985 when it was known as 'The White Paper' . Over the next five 
years The White Paper underwent a substantial transformation and the current BORA is a 
shadow of that originally mooted by the Minister of Justice at the time, The Rt. Hon Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer. For example originally the BORA would have been entrenched, the 
' Treaty of Waitangi' was included and there was a remedies clause for breaches of the 
BORA.9 
The BORA has slowly come to the fore in New Zealand legal landscape. To this 
day it is seen as one of the most important acts in this country. Although only having the 
status of an ordinary act, it has a unique status. It is likely to remain untouched unless a 
significant majority of Parliament or a percentage of a public referendum supported it. It 
would be a bold Parliament to change the BORA by ordinary enactment. 
Most of the focus with the BORA is that it is used in the field of criminal law. 
Most cases that concern the BORA involve criminal activity. To the casual observer the 
BORA is used to get people off on what can sometimes be called minor technicalities or 
breaches of the law, a so-called 'rogues charter.' 
10 An array of literature has commented 
on the Courts approaches to rights that involve the criminal justice system with many of 
the other rights neglected. 11 But the BORA is not just about protecting the rights of those 
6 Sections 19-20 BORA. 
7 See Sections 21-27 BORA. 
8 P Rishworth "Birth of the Bill of Rights" in P Rishworth and G Huscroft Rights and Freedoms: The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers Auckland 1995), 21. 
9 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper Government Printer Wellington 1985. 
10 For example the emergence of the Prima facie exclusion rule in Noort v MOT [1992] 3 NZLR 260. It 
was argued by the Crown there was a minor breach of the right to consult a lawyer, and that requiring 
people to be able to consult a lawyer may effect the ability to get an accurate blood or breath alcohol test. A 
majority of the court said no allowing consultation with a lawyer as recognised by the BORA would not 
affected the testing procedures. The prima facie exclusion rule can be explained that if there is a breach of 
the BORA, all evidence obtained because of that breach will be excluded. Discussion of the case is found 
at: P Rishworth "Two Comments on Ministry of Transport v Noor!: How Does the Bill of Rights Work" 
[ 1992] NZ Recent LR 189; S Optican "The Right to Counsel in Breath/Blood Alcohol Investigations: Noor! 
from the United States Perspective" [1992] NZ Recent LR 200; J Elkind "Random Breath Testing, the Bill 
of Rights and the International Covenant" [1993] NZ Recent LR 335; M Corlett "The NZ Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 and the Right to Counsel" [1994] Auck U LR 579. 
11 See P Rishworth "Applying the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 to Statutes: The Right to a Lawyer in Breath 
and Blood Alcohol Cases" [1991] NZLJ 337; B Robertson "Confessions and the Bill of Rights" [1991] 
NZLJ 398; A Shaw & A Butler "The NZ Bill of rights Comes Alive" [1991] NZLJ 400; J November "The 
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subjected to the criminal law. It is more than a 'rogues charter' and it has been applied in 
numerous cases in the civil jurisdiction. 
This paper's thesis is to examine the potential of the BORA by canvassing the 
majority of civil cases that consider it in civil courts and address the misconception it is 
only used in the criminal courts. The paper will illustrate the approaches courts have 
taken when applying the BORA. The principles and gist of each case will be explained 
and where appropriate constructive and critical comment has been made. The paper will 
cover those cases that have had a significant influence on New Zealand society. By 
identifying those cases it will help to illustrate the potential of the BORA and if it is 
being realised. 
There have been many notable cases over the years from Baigents Case, 
12 
Quilter13 and more recently Moonen, 
14 which are all discussed. The BORA is referred to 
in the civil courts in a number of cases. Most of them add little or nothing to the rapidly 
expanding BORA jurisprudence. 15 
Areas of the law have been identified that have had significant decisions as well 
as a section that looks at some of the rights in general. In each, cases will be listed that 
have considered the BORA but no analysis is required. Not all sections of the BORA will 
be covered as not all have had significant cases. 
NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Transport Act 1962" (1992] NZLJ 206; E McDonald "Hunt: the 
Burden of Proof and the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990" [1992] NZLJ 432; A Shaw & A Butler "Arbitrary 
Arrest and Detention under the NZ Bill of Rights Act" [1993] NZLJ 139; Sir K Keith "Road Crashes and 
the Bill of Rights: A Response" [1994] NZ Recent LR 115; A Butler "The Law of Bail Under the NZ Bill 
of Rights Act: A Note on Gil/banks v Police" [1994] NZ Recent LR 314; S Optican "Gil/banks v Police 
and the Law of Bail Under the NZ Bill of Rights Act: A Reply" [1994] NZ Recent LR 333; A Turner 
"Evidence, Causation and the NZ Bill of Rights Act'' (1996) 8 Auck U LR 75; S Optican "Search and 
Seizure: an Update ons 21 of the Bill of Rights" [1996] NZ Law Rev 215; A Butler "The End of Precedent 
and Principle in Bill of Rights Cases? A note on R v Grayson" [1997] NZ Law Rev 272; S Optican 
"Rolling Backs 21 of the Bill of Rights" [1997] NZLJ 42; H Schwartz "The Short Happy Life and Tragic 
Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" [1998] NZ Law Rev 259; S Optican "Search and Seizure in 
the Court of Appeal - An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of s 21 of the Bill of Rights" (1999) 18 NZULR 
411. 
12 Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigents Case} [1994] 3 NZLR 657. [Baigent] 
13 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] l NZLR 523; [Quilter] 
14 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9. [Moonen] 
15 For example Murray v Whakatane District Council [1997] NZRMA 433. 
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II. Resource Management/Environment. 
Cases involving the interaction between the BORA and the Resource Management Act 
1991 (RMA) have seen an oddity of cases coming up. 16 For instance Zdrahal v 
Wellington City Council17 involved the conflict between freedom of expression and the 
aims of the RMA, 'the importance of the environment, its protection and duty to avoid 
adverse effects to it'.' 18 Mr. Zdrahal had painted swastikas onto his house, which were 
illuminated at night. They were not visible from the street but the neighbours complained 
to the council that these were offensive and objectionable. 
Greig J acknowledged that this was an interpretation issue concerning ss 4, 5 and 
6 BORA and their interaction with s 322 RMA 'Scope of Abatement Notice ' . Greig J 
preferred to take the approach of Hardie Boys J in Noori and read the sections as a whole 
when interpreting the RMA in light of the BORA. He acknowledged the need for 
proportionality and saw the restriction of freedom of expression as slight on the appellant 
as the adverse effects of the environment were more paramount. In terms of section 5 
Greig J saw this as a reasonable limit that could be demonstrably justified in New 
Zealand society when looked at objectively. 
This case was decided wrongly. The effect on the environment was minor with 
the swastikas not visible from the road, and only the neighbours being able to view them. 
The environment needs to be looked at as a whole; the swastikas only form a small part. 
Perhaps because of the inherent offensiveness of swastikas in general, the abatement 
notice was allowed to stand. But offensiveness is not the standard to apply under the 
BORA, whether it is a reasonable limit to stop the expression is. Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression of his or her views, though what they have to say is offensive. 
16 Other cases to discuss the BORA and RMA: Wilhelmsen v Dunedin City Council [1992] NZRMA 284; 
Rowell v Tasman District Council [1997] NZRMA 24; Doug Hood Ltd. v Canterbury Regional Council 
[2000] NZRMA 166; Juken Nissho Ltd. v North/and Regional Council [2000] 2 NZLR 556; Murray v 
Whakatane District Council [1997] NZRMA 433; Fleetwing Farms Ltd. v Marlborough District Council 
[1996] NZRMA 369; South/and Regional Council v Southern Delight Ice Cream (1995) 2 ELRNZ 34; 
Huataki Holdings v Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries (4 August 1995) Unreported High Court Nelson 
M39/94; West Coast Regional v Attorney-General (1994) 8 PRNZ 44. 
17 Zdraha/ v Wellington City Council [1995] I NZLR 700. [Zdrahal] For discussion of this case see B 
Harris "Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Expression in New Zealand" (1996) 8 Otago LR 515; G 
Chappell & S Leavy "Abatement Notices" [ 1995) NZLJ 76; N Wheen "The Angle Grinder, the Swastika, 
and the Airport: Resource Management and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" [1995] BRB 54. 
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Dissent to the status quo is legitimate in any liberal democracy. The Court was required 
to interpret the term "offensive' in light of the purposes underlying freedom of 
expression, and this they did not do so. 19 
Christchurch International Airport v Christchurch City Councit2° was the 
culmination of significant BORA analysis starting in the Planning Tribunal and finishing 
in the High Court. The facts succinctly are that an application for resource consent to 
build a dwelling neat; the airport was made. The applicants would waive their right to 
make a complaint about excessive noise coming from the airport if it was granted. The 
council raised an argument before the court that this was contrary to s 14 BORA 
' Freedom of Expression' as the applicants right to complain about the noise would be 
abrogated. 
Tipping J with Chisholm J entered into a clear lucid analysis of peoples abilities 
to waive their rights under the BORA. Tipping J writing for the court on the BORA 
issues held: 
The concept of freedom pre-supposes not only that you are free to enforce your right but that you 
are free not to enforce it and to waive it, if you choose .... I am of the view that if the person the 
subject of the condition is prepared to consent thereto, it cannot be said that the condition falls foul 
of the BORA. The simple reason is that the person concerned has voluntarily given up pro-tanto 
the relevant rights affirmed under the BORA and such rights are not, in my view, rights which 
should be regarded as incapable of surrender for reasons of public policy ... . It would be a bizarre 
conclusion to hold that a confidentiality agreement of this kind was unenforceable because it fell 
foul of s 14 of the BORA. . .. It would be unduly paternalistic and precious to say that this is a 
kind of right which people should not be allowed to surrender for what they see as their own 
advantage.21 
Tipping J states rights and freedoms are a two-way street, and there is give and take when 
they conflict: 
18 Zdrahal above n 17, 711 . 
19 Harris above n 17, 525. As the French philosopher Voltaire stated "I disapprove of what you say, but I 
will defend to the death your right to say it." At http://quotations.about.com/arts/quotations/library/db/ 
bltop_censor.htm 
2° Christchurch International Airport v Christchurch City Council (1997] 1 NZLR 573 . [ChCh 
International Airport] For Discussion of this case see N Wheen above n 17. 
21 ChCh International Airport above n20, 583-5 . 
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... rights are in any event not absolute. They may be pro-tanto reduced or abrogated ifto do so can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society and the I imitation is prescribed by 
law.22 
Rights are not absolute, that is why we haves 5 BORA, stating there are reasonable limits 
to rights prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Rights do not exist in a vacuum. People can deal with their rights as they wish, it is the 
state that cannot. 
In Kapiti Coast District Council v Raikd3 the Environment Court considered a 
breach of s 16 right to 'Freedom of Assembly'. The council sought an interim 
enforcement order to prevent a house, (which had been severely altered inside, and a six-
foot fence erected) being used as a place of assembly. There had been no resource 
consent granted for the alterations. The court held, Raika's right to freedom of assembly 
had not been breached, as the object of the order was to require them not to assemble 
there until resource consent had been obtained for the alterations. They could still 
assemble just not at that address. 
The decision is flawed an is at odds with current BORA jurisprudence. The 
Environment Court has decided to put their slant on where they see the BORA in relation 
to the RMA. By nature of your right to freedom of assembly, you can peacefully 
•(• I 
assemble regardless· of location. What the court should have looked at is whether the right 
I 
. ••. • I 
they were limiting by requiring Raika to obtain a resource consent for the alterations they 
' ' 
had done to the residence was justified by s 5 BORA. In this case it seems some picky 
bureaucrat got their way. The Highway 61 gang may be full of undesirables, but their 
rights need to be recognised. 
A case of note is Falkner v Gisborne District Council, 24 where an unusual 
argument was raised after the council had cancelled their coastal erosion policy. The 
appellant submitted that as a result there was an unreasonable seizure of their land under 
s 21 BORA, because the sea would eventually erode their land. They submitted that a 
policy of managed retreat would result in an effective 'seizure' (unreasonable under s 21) 
22 ChCh International Airport above n 20, 585. 
23 Kapiti Coast District Council v Raika (1997) 4 HRNZ 116. [Raika] 
24 Falkner v Gisborne District Council [ 1995] 3 NZLR 622. 
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of property because land lost to the sea vests in the crown. Barker J saw this as 
questionable that erosion of the land would amount to a seizure as seizure suggests a 
forceful taking of something. In no way was this forceful. This case is indicative of the 
approach some litigants take today. No matter how absurd any submission involving the 
BORA is advanced though they may be clutching at straws. The BORA it is noted does 
not refer to property interests. 25 
III. Mental Health. 
Mental health is an area of the law that can lead to drastic decisions being made for 
people with or without ~heir consent. The BORA has played a major role in what health 
authorities can and cannot do with those suffering from mental illness. Cases that were 
decided early on after the enactment of the BORA are still the benchmark in the area of 
mental health today. 
In Re M26 Gallen J examined issues conflicting between the Mental Health 
statutes and s 22 BORA 'Liberty of the Person'. Taking a strict approach he held by 
virtue of s 4, that the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1969 continue to apply 
regardless, but that the act needs to be interpreted in light of the BORA.
27 Gallen J 
concluded a detention could not be said to be arbitrary with regard to s 22 if the law 
justified it. After considering all of the evidence from suitably qualified authorities, a 
conclusion that the person needs to be detained cannot be said to be arbitrary.
28 
This case along with Re S, 29 are the leading decisions on the interaction of the 
BORA with mental health. In Re S, Barker J considered s 22 as well as s 11 'Right to 
Refuse Medical Treatment'. He followed Gallen J in Re M, and concluded that though 
leave of absence under s 66 Mental Health Act 1969 is a form of detention if it is legal it 
cannot be arbitrary. Barker J acknowledged: 
25 Cooper v Attorney-General (1996) 3 HRNZ 134, 138. 
26 Re M [1992] I NZLR 29. [Re M] 
27 Re M above n 26, 40. 
28 Re M above n 26, 42. 
29 Re S [1992] I NZLR 363. [Re S] 
8 
[t]he dichotomy between civil liberties and the proper treatment of those who need psychiatric 
institutionalisation and care is not an easy one. Detention may be for the good of the patient as 
well as for the protection of society where the patient has exhibited dangerous qualities.
30 
Barker J emphasised the purposive approach to take when applying the BORA and went 
onto cite Canadian case law as well as the BORA long title. On his analysis of the 
interpretation provisions of the BORA, he concluded: 
ss 4 and 6 can be harmonised if it is recognised that s 11 of the BORA affirms that where there is 
competence to consent (to treatment), and if consent is refused, treatment cannot follow. 
"Everyone" in respect of s 11 must mean "every person who is competent to consent". Being 
mentally disordered and competent are not mutually exclusive.31 
The two cases when looked at together are a concise analysis of the BORA and its 
interaction with the Mental Health statutes. 32 The approaches taken by the High Court is 
entirely correct, as there is nothing more sacred than the liberty of a person. When this is 
jeopardised a strict and practical interpretation of the statute is needed. 
IV. Professions and Trades. 
Lewis v Real Estate Institute of New Zealand Inc. 33 considered issues whether a firm of 
Solicitors could operate what was called a property centre which offered similar services 
to that provided by real estate agents. L submitted this was a breach of s 17 'Freedom of 
Association'. Hardie Boys J writing for the court disdainfully held: 
It is to be hoped that reference to that Act [BORA] will not become a regular argument of last 
resort . ... [we] do not see that this case has anything to do with freedom of association .... 
30 Re S above n 29, 371. 
31 Re S above n29, 374. 
32 Other cases that refer to the BORA are Re M [1993] OCR 153 (District Court Rehearing); In the matter 
ofC [1993) NZFLR 877; In the matter of JK [1994] NZFLR 678; Re F SL (1993) 11 FRNZ 54 alt cite. Re 
LB [1994) NZFLR 60; Re R W D (1994) 12 FRNZ 387; Re MA A (1994) 12 FRNZ 539; Re Tahere [1995) 
OCR 545; Re R M[l998] NZFLR 568. 
33 Lewis v Real Estate lnsitute of New Zealand [1995] 3 NZLR 385. [Lewis] 
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Restrictions on professional or business activities are more appropriately to be considered in the 
context of law as to restraint of trade.
34 
The case is only notable because of the prophecy of Hardie Boys J with comment 
directed at the fact BORA arguments are brought up at the last minute and seem to be a 
hit and hope mission where the litigant is pleading everything but the kitchen sink. On its 
face looking at the facts, it is clear a BORA argument would have little show of getting 
off the ground. 
Wheen v Real Estate Agents Licensing Boarcf5 involved W a British citizen, who 
had real estate qualifications from the United Kingdom wishing to have his qualifications 
recognised to enable him to work here. The Real Estate Institute of New Zealand 
(REINZ) informed him that there was no system to recognise his qualifications and he 
would have to sit the local examinations. Wheen complained under numerous acts 
including s 19(2) BORA that by not recognising his qualifications they had discriminated 
against him because of his overseas origins. The REINZ subsequently altered their 
procedures but Wheen still carried on with his complaint. Williams J held this was not 
discrimination and concluded: 
The lack of a system for recognising qualifications bore no more heavily on applicants of New 
Zealand origin, who might have acquired qualifications overseas, than on similarly qualified 
applicants of any other national origin. The lack of this system, therefore, may have discriminated 
against persons who had not passed the REINZ' s examinations, but such is not unlawful.
36 
The case is clear and straight to the point. As the judge pointed out, if a New Zealander 
had qualifications from overseas they would still have to re-sit exams to New Zealand 
standards. 
34 Lewis above n 33, 393. 
35 Wheen v Real Estate Agents Licensing Board (1997) 4 HRNZ 15. [Wheen] 
36 Wheen above n 35, 29. Other cases in this area of the law include Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201; Sheehan v 
Valuers Registration Board [ 1998] OCR 159. 
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V. Procedure. 
What distinguishes many of the Procedure cases that have relied on the BORA, is that 
section 27 'Right to Justice' is submitted in argument in an extraordinary number of 
cases.37 Probably because the hearing is rushed, at the last minute, and is at an 
interlocutory stage, before an actual trial gets under way. Under the section b~ the right 
to natural justice (s27 (1)), to bring judicial review proceedings (s 27(2)) and to bring 
C:ivil proceedings against the crown (s 27(3)) have been argued.
38 Counsel it could be 
argued are submitting everything and can colloquially be said to be using the shotgun or 
scatter gun approach, where hopefully something they plead in argument will stick. 
Contempt of court, an offence found in the common law was at issue in Solicitor-
General v Radio New Zealand. 39 Journalists from Radio New Zealand had made 
broadcasts based on interviews with members of the jury from the murder trial of David 
Tamihere for two Swedish tourists. 'The full court of the High Court held that the BORA 
applies to the common law, as the BORA applies to acts done by the judiciary under s 
3(a). The right to freedom of expression the Court stated needs to be balanced against 
other rights, and in this case s 25 BORA, 'Minimum Standards of Criminal Procedure.' 
Here the process of the fair and impartial trial could be jeopardised and this is of utmost 
importance in a democratic society. '40 Each right is seen as the equal of the other and 
they need to be balanced in this way. 
37 Other cases to discuss the BORA include Greenpeace New Zealand Inc. v Minister of Fisheries [1995] 2 
NZLR 463; Board of Trustees ofTuakau College v TVNZ (1996) 3 HRNZ 87; Jayamohan v Jayamohan 
(1997) 4 HRNZ 522 Alt cit. J v J (1997) 15 FRNZ 486; Proceedings Commissioner v Stowell (1996) 3 
HRNZ 662; Gazley v Attorney-General (1996) 10 PRNZ 47. 
38 A number of the cases are Mark Winter Waikato v Tracy International Ltd. (24 March 1999) Unreported 
Hamilton High Court A 166/98; Tangiora v Legal Aid Review Authority [1999] 2 NZLR 114; Bulmer v 
Attorney General (1998) 12 PRNZ 3 I 6; Proceedings Commissioner v Stowell ( I 996) 3 HRNZ 662; Xv Y 
[I 996] 2 NZLR 196; Concept Carpentry Ltd. v Bates [1996] DCR 463 ; Director General of Social Welfare 
v Cherrywood Retirement Home Ltd. ( I 994) 8 PRNZ 20; Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General 
[1994] 2 NZLR 45 I; West Coast Regional Council v Attorney General (I 994) 8 PRNZ 44; Derrick v 
Attorney General [1994] I NZLR I 12; Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd. v Wilson Neill Ltd. 
[I 993] 2 NZLR 617. 
39 Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand [I 994] 1 NZLR 48 (HC), Eichelbaum CJ and Greig J. [SG v 
Radio NZ]; A case that had a similar finding was Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General [ 1995] 3 NZLR 563. 
40 SG v Radio NZ above n 39, 58-60. 
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Dujf v Cornrnunicado Ltd'' saw author Alan Duff, suing the defendants for a share 
of the profits of the film 'Once Were Warriors'. Duff had made public comments pending 
the litigation for the contractual dispute and contempt of court proceedings were 
instigated. Blanchard J in the High Court held that contempt of court was subject to the 
BORA under s 3(a) after applying SG v Radio NZ, and both needed to be read together. 
Thus Duff's comments were protected by s 14. Blanchard J went onto discuss s 5 of the 
BORA, asking is the contempt a limit on Duff's freedom of expression? He concluded: 
[every] case of contempt of Court involves balancing the benefits of freedom of expression against 
the benefits of protecting the administration of justice. That balancing is best done on the facts of 
each case rather than in the abstract. . .. there is good reason to assess the doctrine overall against 
the Bill of Rights. In doing so the focus ought to be on whether the law of contempt limits 
freedom of expression as much as is reasonable.42 
The Court in these past two cases are quite right in their findings and especially so in 
acknowledging that the BORA applies to the common law. The BORA is all 
encompassing. This holds significance especially for the law of tort, which will be 
discussed below as now relevant factors have to be taken into account when deciding 
cases concerning defamation or exemplary damages. 
VI. Immigration. 
Immigration cases that have submitted a BORA issue often fall into the category of 
offering up any argument that will get the litigant a late reprieve from deportation.43 
Section 27 BORA 'Right to Justice' is cited in cases as one of a number of arguments 
41 Du.ffv Communicado Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 89. [Du.ff] 
42 Du.ff above n 41 , 99-100. 
43 Other cases discussing the BORA include Tishkovets v Minister of Immigration (I May 2000) 
Unreported High Court Auckland M632-SWOO; Hasmeer v Removal review Authority (15 March 2000) 
Unreported Auckland High Court 134/98 & M 1733/98; Singh (Ma/kit) v Attorney-General (2 November 
1999) Unreported Auckland High Court M 1640/99; Talia/au v Minister of Immigration (May 4 1999) 
Unreported Auckland High Court M l 71-SW99 (s 18); Schier v Removal Review Authority [1999] 1 NZLR 
703 (s 18); Lal v Residence Appeal Authority (1999) 5 HRNZ 11 (s 19); Elika v Minister of Immigration 
[ 1996] I NZLR 741 (s 18); Quensell v Immigration Department (21 September 1992) Unreported High 
Court Rotorua AP59/91. 
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that can be raised but sometimes without merit.
44 The litigant is usually often already 
pursuing common law judicial review grounds, to set aside the decision of the 
government entity and the BORA is thrown in as well. 
Indeed in the High Court Tompkins J in Mia O Lin v Attorney-Genera/
45 
commented that s 27 BORA does not add anything to administrative law requirement that 
natural justice principles be observed. This is questionable. Under the BORA what is 
being asked for is vindication of a right, whereas in administrative law only a review can 
be made of the procedure the decision-maker went through. Under the BORA different 
remedies are available, such as injunctions, declarations, stays of proceedings, exclusion 
of evidence or compensation. Under administrative law the case is remitted back to the 
original decision-maker for reconsideration. The BORA has a role to play, but it seems 
many litigants are putting it up regardless and not considering the appropriateness of the 
argument they are trying.46 
Puli 'uvea v Removal Review Authority
47 involved the challenging of a deportation 
order of a couple who had had, while in New Zealand on temporary permits three 
children. BORA grounds were advanced under s 9 that deportation would amount to 
excessive and cruel treatment. Keith J concluded: 
[t]he action of removing Mrs. Puli'uvea cannot be said to begin to attain to the high threshold 
required by the prohibition in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on disproportionately severe 
treatment. The cases here and elsewhere expand on such constitutional guarantees by using 
expressions such as 'treatment that is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency.
48 
A generous rights centred approach is required but this would be reading the BORA very 
liberally to conclude that what the Puli'uvea's are suffering is severely harsh treatment. A 
44 Cases that can be reasonably put into this category are Butler v Removal Review Authority (12 October 
1998) Unreported, High Court Wellington CP58/97; Daly v Removal Review Authority (26 March 1998) 
Unreported Auckland High Court 135/97; Faavae v Minister of Immigration [ 1996] 2 NZLR 243; Ali v 
Deportation Review Tribunal [1997) NZAR 208. 
45 Mia O Lin v Attorney-General (19 May 1999) Unreported, High Court Auckland M307SW/99. He was 
following the observation made by Blanchard J in New Zealand Private Hospitals Association v Northern 
Regional Health Authority (7 December 1994) Unreported High Court Auckland CP 440/94, at 31 "I find 
nothing in s 27( I) extending the law of judicial review. Whether there has been a breach by North Health of 
the principles of natural justice is not, in my opinion, dependent upon s 27." 
46 See Administrative section below and as well section on Baigent action that covers remedies. 
47 Puli 'uvea v Attorney-General ( 1996) 2 HRNZ 510. 
48 Puli 'uvea above n 47,523 . 
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logical and not an absolute interpretation is needed and it would not be realistic to 
conclude that the punishment they are receiving is unduly oppressive when looked at 
objectively. 
VII. Employment. 
The BORA and employment law do not go hand in hand all that often as employment law 
is primarily concerned with private law. By virtue of s 3(a) the BORA is relevant to 
private litigation.49 The BORA is often submitted to support applicants at an interlocutory 
stage of the proceedings.50 The two sections often cited are s 14 'Freedom of Expression' 
and s 17 'Freedom of Association'. Most cases concern contract negotiations between the 
parties and in particular the interaction with s 12 of The Employment Contracts Act 1991 
(ECA), 'Authority to Represent'. Three of the leading cases in this area were all decided 
in the Court of Appeal. 
Eketone v Alliance Textiles51 involved a dispute where there was a presumption of 
undue influence in the negotiating of the contract between the employer firm and the 
authorised union agents for the employees. Gault J in obiter commented: 
Freedom of association is, of course, much broader than the rights to join or not join a trade union. 
However, in the present context that is what is in issue .... It is not open to the Courts to depart 
from the plain meaning of the words of the statute [ECA] but where it can be done (and the Bill of 
Rights Act requires it) the statute is to be given meaning consistent with the freedom of 
49 See for discussion of private litigation and BORA, A Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Private 
Common Law Litigation" [1991] NZLJ 261. 
50 Other employment law cases to discuss the BORA include New Zealand Van lines Ltd. v Gray [1999] 2 
NZLR 397; Air New Zealand v Kippenberger [1999] 1 ERNZ 390; Ports of Auckland v New Zealand 
Seafarers Industrial Union of Workers (26 November 1998) Unreported Auckland High Court CL40/97; 
Dicksons Service Centre v Noel [1998] 3 ERNZ 841; NZEI v State Services Commission [1997] ERNZ 381; 
Clarke v Attorney-Genera/ [1997] ERNZ 600; Mabon v The Conference of Methodist Church [1997] 
ERNZ 690; BHP (NZ) v O'Dea (1997) 4 HRNZ 456; Leslie v Attorney-General [1996] 1 ERNZ 287; Frank 
v Air New Zealand Ltd. (1995) 4 NZELC 98, 352; Armstrong v Attorney-Genera/ [1995] 1 ERNZ 43; 
Talbot v Air New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 ERNZ 609; Zinck v Sleepyhead Manufacturing [1995] 2 ERNZ 
448; Ussher v Te Kuiti Meat Processors [1995] 2 ERNZ 612; Lowe v Tararua District Council [1994] I 
ERNZ 887; McGinty v Northern Distribution Union [1992] 1 ERNZ 196; Radio Horowhenua v Bradley 
[1993] 2 ERNZ 1085; Hobbs v North Shore City Council [1992] I ERNZ 32; Purdon v Mc Vicar Timber 
Group Ltd [1992] I ERNZ 531; MacDonaldv Health Technology Ltd. [1992] 2 ERNZ 735. 
51 £ketone v Alliance Textiles [1993] 2 ERNZ 783. [Eke tone] 
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association as internationally recognised . .. . [any] move to preclude all attempts to influence a 
person's choice would risk conflict with another fundamental right - the freedom of expression .
52 
And concluded: 
It cannot be doubted that certain employees are vulnerable to influence from strong employers and 
might readily submit to influence exerted directly or in subtle ways. It is important to ensure that 
in such cases their freedom to choose is assured and is not interfered with by undue influence. 
That is best done by dealing with particular circumstances as they arise when the true nature of the 
relationship can be assessed in conjunction with particular conduct said to deny the freedom to 
choose. This is a more sensitive instrument for achieving the proper balance between the 
competing rights than the imposition ofa legal presumption of undue influence in all cases.
53 
Again it is emphasised that rights exist on a two way street and there is a degree of 
balancing between the two acts and the aims of both. Afterall the objective of the ECA 
was to create an efficient labour market and provide for freedom of association. 
54 Gault J 
clearly set out that balance is needed, especially when looking at New Zealand's 
international obligations under the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
The Eketone case served as blueprint for future employment law cases. In Capital 
Coast Health v New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union55 Hardie Boys J 
acknowledged the approach of Gault J in Eke tone and added: 
[the] Employment Contracts Act must be seen as essentially practical legislation designed to deal 
with everyday practical situations. It is not appropriate to subject it to esoteric analysis or draw 
fine distinctions in its application. As Gault J said in £ketone it is a matter in each case of striking 
a balance between the competing rights of the parties . . .. It is not a case of one prevailing over the 
other, but of both being given sensible and practical effect.56 
52 £ketone above n 51, 795 . 
53 £ketone above n 51 , 796. 
54 See long title Employment Contracts Act 1991 (has now been repealed and is to be replaced by the 
Employment Relations Act 2000, coming into force in October). 
55 Capital Coast Health v New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union [1996] 1 NZLR 7. [Capital 
Coast Health] 
56 Capital Coast Health above n 55, 18. 
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The point is, the BORA is not a specialist statute but one that is all encompassing and 
needs to be read in conjunction with statutes that deal directly with specific areas of the 
law. We need to heed the warning given by the Court that a practical approach is required 
not one that gets tied up in legalese and semantics. 
New Zealand Fire Service Commission v lvam/7 ended up dividing the Court of 
Appeal. It concerned again the application of s 12(2) of the ECA, which requires the 
employer to recognise the bargaining agent of the employee. The Fire Service 
Commission while involved in contract negotiations that had been under way for a period 
of time issued a pack of information to the media and the firefighters union and 
distributed this material around the country to fire stations managers outlining the 
Commissions offer of employment. The information by oversight was issued early and 
the union pulled out of negotiations. 
The majority adopted the dicta of Gault J in Eke tone and Hardie Boys J in Capital 
Coast Health58 again commenting on the need to for a balance between the BORA and 
ECA. The majority also observed that the s 17 BORA right to 'Freedom of Association' 
was assured by Part I of the ECA. They added: 
The issue is not one of conflict between freedom of association .. . and freedom of expression. The 
right to have a representative recognised as authorised to conduct negotiations for an employment 
contract arises out of but generally is not regarded as an element of, the freedom of association. 
The issue here is the construction and application of the statutory obligation imposed on 
employers in s 12(2) [ECA]. That must be given meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights Act (s6) which include freedom of expression.59 
Although being repetitive the Court emphasises the correct approach to take particularly 
in the specialist area of employment law, where often bitter and public disputes arise 
between employers and employees and unions. A consistent approach that gives effect to 
both statutes is called for. 
The dissenting opinions of Lord Cooke of Thorndon and Thomas J echo similar 
thoughts about striking a balance between the individual rights and the act being 
57 New Zealand Fire Service Commission v Jvamy [ 1996) 2 NZLR 587 (Richardson P, Gault and Henry JJ 
for the majority; Lord Cooke ofThomdon and Thomas J dissenting). [Jvamy] 
58 lvamy above n 57, 598-600. 
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interpreted. They reached a different result on their interpretation of the facts . Thomas J 
went onto add on top of the dictum from Eke tone and Capital Coast Health: 
It therefore needs to be stressed that, while the right to freedom of expression and the right to 
freedom of association, out of which collective bargaining arises, may influence the interpretation 
of s 12(2), freedom of expression cannot be permitted to lead to an interpretation or appl ication of 
the section which would defeat the objective of enabling collective bargaining to operate in terms 
of the act. The statutory requirements of the act must prevail. 
60 
This is where the interpretation provisions of the BORA ss 4, 5, and 6 come into play. 
We need look no further than the prophetic words of the Court of Appeal on how to 
interpret statutes in light of the BORA in Noort and more recently the case of Moonen v 
Film and Literature Board of Review. 61 
Harrison v Tucker Wool Processors Ltd. 62 1s illustrative of the harsh and 
oppressive employment contracts some employers try and get away with. Clauses in the 
employee's employment contract made it necessary for them to undergo medical 
treatment. The Chief Judge of the Employment Court Goddard CJ when discussing s 11 
BORA stated: 
[It] is fundamental to the law of New Zealand that it is the basic right of every New Zealander to 
decide for himself or herself whether to undergo. medical examination and whether to agree to 
medical treatment, surgical or otherwise. Almost every form of medical treatment involves some 
kind of assault or intrusion and consent on each separate occasion is necessary and cannot 
ordinarily be validly given in advance because consent means informed consent.63 
Rights should not be easily extinguished particularly given situations such as these, 
where employers regardless of the circumstances which to impose certain employment 
conditions.64 Employers do want to create a safe working environment and that is there 
justification, but it needs to be kept in mind that situations where people are forced to 
59 Ivamy above n 57, 599. 
60 Ivamy above n57, 613 . 
61 Moonen above n 14. See below n 171 for discussion of the case. 
62 Harrison v Tucker Wool Processes (1998) 4 HRNZ 641. [Harrison] 
63 Harrison above n 62 HRNZ, 645 . 
64 For discussion of the BORA and workplace drug testing see A Shaw "Drug Testing in the Workplace and 
the Bill of Rights" [1995] NZ Law Review 22 . 
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perform specific tasks does not bode well for a friendly environment that they are trying 
to create. 
VIII. Family. 
Cases within the realm of family law have covered a range of the rights contained in the 
BORA. As is often the case in family law, the parties on each side are usually 
diametrically opposed with situations where one party is trying to force a condition onto 
the other. This is particularly so with paternity cases where the s 11 'Right to refuse 
Medical Treatment' is invoked.65 
Guardianship cases also are often contentious with a lot at stake for those 
involved. In Re J (An Jnfant}66 the Court of Appeal looked at issues that saw a clash of 
rights, here s 8 'Right Not to Be Deprived of Life' and s 15 'Manifestation of Religion 
and Belief.' A three-year old child suffered a life-threatening nosebleed and needed an 
operation that would require the use of a blood transfusion or other related blood 
products. The parents were Jehovah's Witnesses and declined to consent to the procedure 
taking place with the use of outside blood products. Orders were made in the High Court 
making the child a ward of the Court, and appointing a medical doctor as agent of the 
Court in respect of . consent required for treatment involving a blood transfusion. 
Challenges were made to this order under the Health Act 1956, Guardianship Act 1968 
and the BORA. 
The case involved conflict between parents' rights to hold true to their beliefs 
under their religion and the right of the child not to be deprived of the right to life. Gault J 
for the Court67 approached the case from a practical viewpoint. He concluded: 
The right of parents to manifest religion in practice extends to bringing up and educating children 
in that religion until such time as their children are able to exercise their own freedom of religion. 
65 Cases applying s 11 BORA include Waters v Reid (No.2) (17 July 1998) Unreported Family Court, New 
Plymouth, FP043/139/98 (sl l); B v M [1997] 3 NZLR 202; Iv S (7 November 1997) Unreported High 
Court Christchurch M305/96 (sl I); CMP v Director General of Social Welfare (1996) 15 FRNZ 40; Mv M 
[Guardianship} ( 1996) 14 FRNZ 102; Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court [ 1995] 1 NZLR 603 ; 
Director-General of Social Welfare vS(l995) 13 FRNZ 118; B vS(l994) 12 FRNZ 473; Hi/Iv Moti 
[1994] NZFLR 535 (sl l); Cairns v James and Cox [1990-92] NZBORR 323. 
66 Re J [1996] 2 NZLR 134; alt cite Band B v Director General of Social Welfare.[Re J] 
67 Richardson P, Gault, McKay, Henry and Temm JJ . 
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The upbringing of children extends to making decisions for them as to health and medical 
treatment. ... Every child has the right not to be deprived of life except on such grounds as are 
established by law and consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. If the parental right to 
consent to and refuse medical treatment for a child there is a potential overlap between that right 
and the child's fundamental right to life.
68 
Gault J to resolve the conflict did not see it as an easy implementation of s 5 BORA but 
by looking at the scope of the rights and how far they could extend: 
The parents' right to practice their religion cannot extend to imperil the life or health of the child. 
Before it would become necessary to embark upon a s 5 examination it would be necessary to 
define the scope of the right to practise religion as extending (notwithstanding the right of a child 
to life) to the right to refuse medical treatment for the child on religious grounds even in 
circumstances where it is evident death will ensue without that treatment. We are not able to do 
that. ... Accordingly we prefer to approach potential conflicts of rights assured under the Bill of 
Rights Act on the basis that the rights are to be defined so as to be given effect compatibly. The 
scope of one right is not to be taken as so broad as to impinge upon and limit others.
69 
The case illustrates the dilemma that courts are faced with. Both the parents and the child 
have legitimate recourse to have their rights protected. Rights are not absolute and they 
need to be read in conjunction with other rights with a degree of flexibility. When there is 
conflict it is not appropriate for one right to limit the other. All rights are pro tanto the 
same as each other and as Gault J said, should be read as compatible with each other. 
There have been other cases that have dealt with similar issues of guardianship
70 
and one in particular that developed considerable media attention. Newspapers 
Publishers Association of New Zealand (Inc) v Family Court
71 concerned the treatment of 
a young boy, Liam Williams-Holloway for cancer. His parents had decided they wanted 
to try alternative treatment as opposed to the conventional chemotherapy that would be 
performed by Healthcare Otago. Subsequently they went into hiding and application was 
68 ReJabove n 66, 145-146. 
69 Re J above n 66, 146. 
70 Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd. v L & L (1998) 17 FRNZ 376; B v Department of Social Welfare 
( 1998) 16 FRNZ 522; Re L [Guardianship} (1994) 11 FRNZ 553; Alt. cit. Paddy v L [1994] NZFLR 352; 
Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd. v Liu (11 July 1996) Unreported High Court Auckland M812/96 
71 
Newspaper Publishers Association of New Zealand v Family Court [1999] 2 NZLR 344. [NPANZ] 
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made to make Liam a ward of the court under s 9 Guardianship Act 1968. When making 
an order s 23 of the Guardianship Act needs to be taken into account. It provides 
23. Welfare of child paramount - (I) In any proceedings where any matter relating to the 
custody or guardianship of or access to a child, . . . is in question , the Court shall regard the welfare 
of the child as the first and paramount consideration ... 
Widespread public interest and debate was generated after a news release was made 
inquiring into the whereabouts of the parents. Counsel appointed by the court for the 
child applied for a suppression order. The Family Court granted an order, which was very 
wide and applied to the soliciting or publication of any information, whatsoever to do 
with the case. 
The court acknowledged a balancing process is required between the rights of the 
child, his family and the medical authorities and the media with regards to being able to 
report this information. The court did not see the situation as one where by virtue of s 4 
BORA the Guardianship Act would take preference, but rather by application of s 5 and 
6, the right of the media to freedom of expression could only be impinged as little as 
possible. The High Court adopted the analysis of the interpretation provisions of Hardie 
Boys J in Noort72 and concluded: 
Accepting that s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act must be brought to account, it follows 
that any suppression order should be tailored to intrude only to the extent necessary to ensure that 
Liam' s welfare is protected as a first and paramount consideration .. .. 73 
They redirected the case back to a hearing of the full court for reconsideration of the 
suppression order and on the BORA points stated that the Family Court Judge: 
[rightly] regarded the paramountcy principles [of the child] as the first consideration, but failed to 
recognise that freedom of expression, here effectively the freedom of the media, also needed to be 
taken into account to the maximum extent possible with Liam's welfare.
74 
72 NP ANZ above n 71,351 adopting Hardie Boys in Noort above n 7, 287. 
73 NPANZabove n 71,351. 
74 NPANZabove n 71,352. 
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The case endorses freedom of expression and clearly demonstrates the practical effect the 
BORA is playing within the courts even in extreme factual situations such as this. It is 
not just a case of playing one statute off against each other but striking a balance as 
envisaged bys 6 BORA. 
Quilter v Attorney-Genera/75 is one of the more controversial cases that has been 
decided within the family law jurisdiction. The case is not just controversial because of 
its subject matter but also because of the divergent results in the case concerning the 
discussion of discrimination. The case has already been the subject of much (somewhat 
harsh) academic debate.76 
The facts succinctly are that three lesbian couples challenged that they were being 
discriminated against because of the refusal of the Registrar of Births Deaths and 
Marriages to issue them a marriage license under the Marriage Act 1955. Andrew Butler 
has summed up the decision in the New Zealand Law Journal: 
The Court of Appeal held (a) by a majority (3-2) that a prohibition on same-sex marriage did not 
amount to a prima facie infringement of the appellants' right to be free from discrimination; and 
(b) unanimously that the concept of marriage contemplated by the Marriage Act was the 
traditional female-male partnership and, accordingly, it would not be right to interpret the Act in a 
manner consistently with the right to be free from sexual orientation discrimination because that 
would be to repeal the Act contrary to s 4 of the Bill ofRights.77 
The case was a benchmark as it was the Court of Appeals first substantial look at s 19 
BORA 'Freedom from Discrimination'. This was not the ideal factual situation to answer 
these issues. Whether gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to marry is a subject 
that conjures up stirring debate still, as is the debate on extending property rights to them. 
Although there is force in the comments of Thomas J about the concept of marriage and 
75 Quilter above n 13. 
76 See Grant Huscroft "Discrimination, Dignity, and the Limits of Equality" Otago LR 9 (2000) 697; 
Andrew Butler "Same-Sex Marriage and Discrimination" [ 1998] NZLJ 229; Andrew Butler "Same-Sex 
Marriage and Freedom from Discrimination in New Zealand" [1998] PL 396; Paul Rishworth "Reflections 
on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney-General' [1998] NZ Law Rev 683. Most commentators are 
quite scathing of the result in the case especially of the approach of the majority. Also another case that has 
looked at issues to do with discrimination is Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights 
Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218. 
77 Andrew Butler "Same-Sex Marriage Discrimination" [ 1998] NZLJ 229. [Butler NZLJ] The bench 
comprised Richardson P, Gault and Keith JJ for the majority and Thomas and Tipping JJ in the minority. 
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how archaic the term now is, I along with many people in New Zealand society still 
believe that marriage is a union between a male and female. That is not to say this is not 
discrimination. 
I agree with the judgments of Thomas and Tipping JJ particularly the points of 
their judgments that Butler alluded to: 
Both emphasised the importance of anti-discrimination laws in realising a societal commitment to 
the recognition of each person's individual worth regardless of individual differences .... in 
determining whether there is discrimination the enquiry must focus on impact and both were clear 
that on an impact analysis restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples was prima facie 
discriminatory. 78 
The brief point that I wish to make and which the judgements fail to answer is a s 5 
analysis, where this could be seen as a justifiable limitation in a free and democratic 
society. Only Thomas J asks the question whether the discrimination is justifiable and he 
answered 'no'. I would venture to say that the prima facie denial of a marriage license is 
discrimination. But is justifiable, particularly as was pointed out by Tipping J it is highly 
unlikely that Parliament would have contemplated a change to one of society's 
fundamental institutions by the indirect route of s 19 and s 6 of the Bill of Rights. 
79 
When we look at the history of the concept of marriage it is a traditional part of 
the make up of society, and to suddenly change this by reference to discrimination is not 
sustainable. To do so would be usurping the function of Parliament. As well, as was 
pointed out by all of the Justices any change to the status of marriage must come from 
Parliament, as this is an area of the law that reflects social values and policy.
80 The 
concept of marriage is well and truly entrenched into the psyche of society and is a 
justifiable limitation and so the discrimination is permitted. 
78 Andrew Butler, "Same-sex marriage and freedom from discrimination in New Zealand" [1998] PL 396. 
[Butler Public] 
79 Quilter above n 13, 5 81. 
80 Quliter above n 13, per Gault J 526, per Thomas J 528 . 
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IX. Baigent/Tort Action. 
This section covers both tort and the new public law Baigent action for breach of the 
BORA. Both categories are different and separate though it must be conceded that they 
are similar, as the types of remedies available for each are the same (i.e. declarations, 
injunctions, and damages/compensation). The categories are grouped together because 
often when a cause of action in tort is pleaded there is a corresponding Baigent action 
pleaded. 81 The High Court recently explained the difference: 
A. 
[There] is a distinction in principle between awards of damages at common law and compensation 
for breach of the NZBORA. The former is as private law remedy while the latter is a public law 
claim against the state for what has been done in the exercise of the state's power. Damages at 
common law are essentially to compensate the plaintiff for his or her loss while if compensation is 
payable is for breach of the NZBORA, it is to give effect to or vindicate the fundamental rights 
preserved under the act. 82 
Baigent. 
A remedial regime based on the BORA derived from Simpson v Attorney-General 
[Baigents Case]. 83 This is the most significant case in the history of the BORA so far. If 
Noort showed that the BORA has some teeth, Baigent demonstrated that they were not 
false but the real thing. 
Baigent has been well canvassed in BORA literature. 
84 The facts briefly are that 
the police continued to execute a search warrant for a drug dealer, after being told 
81 For example in the case of Whithair v Attorney-General [1996] 2 NZLR 45; (1996) 2 HRNZ 388, W 
pleaded causes of action in tort for wrongful imprisonment and public law action in breach of s 23(3) 
BORA, failure to be brought before a court as soon as possible. Also see Upton v Green (No2) (1996) 3 
HRNZ 179. 
82 Attorney-General v Hewitt [2000] 2 NZLR 110, per Randerson and Neazor JJ citing Baigent above n 12, 
692 per Casey J, 703 per Hardie Boys J and 718 per McKay J. 
83 Baigent above n 12. To be read contemporaneously with Auckland Unemployed Workers Rights Centre v 
Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 720. 
84 See; J Smillie "The Allure of"Rights Talk": Baigents Case in the Court of Appeal" (1994) 8 Otago LR 
188; J Allan "Speaking With the Tongues of Angels: The Bill of Rights Simpson and the Court of Appeal" 
[ 1994) BORB 2; J Brookfield "Constitutional Law" [1994) NZRLR 376; R Harrison "The Remedial 
Jurisdiction for Breach of the Bill of Rights" in P Rishworth and G Huscroft (eds.) Rights and Freedoms: 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, 1995) 401-45; J 
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repeatedly by neighbours, the occupant's son and her daughter (a barrister) that they had 
the wrong house. 85 
The plaintiffs pleaded four causes of action in tort and the fifth a cause of action 
in public law, breach of s 21 BORA. In the High Court, all the claims were struck out as 
disclosing no reasonable cause of action and that s 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 
1950 acted as a complete bar to any tortious action by the state.
86 The Court of Appeal 
held by a majority87 that the causes of action based on trespass and abuse of process 
should be reinstated. The Court created a new cause of action and remedy by reinstating 
the pleadings based on breach of the BORA, which would not be affected by the crown 
immunity as it was an action in public and not private tort law. The crown argued that 
because there was an absence of remedial provisions, the cause of action could not 
succeed, and overseas authorities could not be relied on because those instruments were 
supreme law and the BORA was only an ordinary enactment. The majority gave this 
short shrift with Cooke P stating forthrightly: 
It is necessary to be alert in New Zealand to the danger that both the Courts and Parliament at 
times may give, or at least be asked to give, lip service to human rights in high-sounding language, 
but little or no real service in terms of actual decisions. 
88 
There should be no difference at all. Rights are the same whether they are entrenched or 
not. 
The majority held there was a remedy available based in public law and based 
their decision on significant constitutional decisions from other jurisdictions
89 and by 
reference to the long title of the BORA and the ICCPR as indicative of the need for an 
Smillie "Fundamental" Rights, Parliamentary Supremacy and the New Zealand Court of Appeal" (1995) 
111 LQR 209; R Harrison "He That is Without Sophistry, Let Him Cast the First Epithet" (1995) BORB 
18; Adrian Hunt "Fundamental Rights and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" LQR 111 (1995) 565; R 
Harrison "Public Law and Private Redress" NZ Law Rev [1996] 478; John Miller "Seeking Compensation 
for Bill of Rights Breaches" (1996) 1 HRLP 211; Campbell Thomas Walker "Wilkes and Liberty: A 
Critique of the Prima Facie Exclusionary Rule" NZULR 17 (1996) 69; P Radich and R Best "Baigent: An 
update" [1997] NZLJ 207; 
8 For a full account of the facts see the judgement of Casey J Baigent above n 12, 684. 
86 J Smillie 'The Allure of Rights Talk: Baigents case in the Court of Appeal" (1994) 8 Otago LR 188, 189. 
87 Cooke P and Casey Hardie Boys and McKay JJ; Gault J dissenting on BORA point. 
88 Baigent above n 12, 676. 
89 Maharaj v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago (No2) [1979] AC 385; Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld 
Raym 938. 
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effective remedy for breach of rights. 9° Casey and Hardie Boys JJ best sum up the thrust 
of the j udgment. Casey J: 
I am satisfied that the purpose and intention of the Bill of Rights Act is that there be an adequate 
public law remedy for infringement obtainable through the Courts which, as noted above, are 
already according it in the sphere of criminal law [the prima facie exclusionary rule]. What is 
adequate will be for the Courts to determine in the circumstances of each case. In some way it may 
be that already obtainable under existing legislation or at common law; in others, where such 
remedies are unavailable or inadequate, the Court may award compensation for infringement, or 
settle on some non-monetary option as appropriate. In this way the rights affirmed by the Bill can 
be protected and promoted as an integral part of our legal framework.91 
And Hardie Boys J: 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, unless it is to be no more than an empty statement, is a 
commitment by the Crown that those who in the three branches of the government exercise its 
functions, powers and duties will observe the rights that the Bill affirms. It is I consider implicit in 
that commitment, indeed essential to its worth, that the Courts are not only to observe the Bill in 
the discharge of their own duties but are able to grant appropriate and effective remedies where 
rights have been infringed. I see no reason to think that this should depend on the terms of a 
written constitution. Enjoyment of the basic human rights are the entitlement of every citizen, and 
their protection the obligation of every civilised state. They are inherent in and essential to the 
structure of society. They do not depend on the legal or constitutional form in which they are 
declared.92 
This new public law cause of action created many debates when judgment was delivered, 
and the Court of Appeal was criticised in some quarters for judicial law making.
93 The 
90 Anna Adams "Competing Conceptions of the Constitution: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
and the Cooke Court of Appeal" [1996] NZ Law Rev 368,375. 
91 Baigent above n 12,692. 
92 Baigent above n 12, 702. 
93 See Smillie above n 86. 
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Law Commission was even asked to prepare a report on whether legislation should be 
enacted to overrule the j udgment. 
94 
The case is a turning point in BORA jurisprudence as it showed the courts were 
according the BORA a right centred approach. Giving effect to the rights and what they 
stand for is important, not how they are written. Where there is a right there should be a 
remedy ,95 and that remedy has to be appropriate in the circumstances. It must be stressed 
the appropriate term from Baigent is compensation and not damages as 'compensation is 
awarded against the state for such breaches by state servants, agents or instrumentalities 
is a public law remedy and not a form of vicarious liability for tort. '
96 It needs to be 
approached as an entirely new form of remedy, whose precise nature and relationship 
with other areas of the law will need to be worked out incrementally.
97 
The only comment I wish to make on Baigents case is that the case demonstrates 
that the BORA is not just an ordinary statute like the many others passed every year by 
our Parliament. The Court of Appeal was prepared to look beyond the discrepancies in 
the BORA, in the fact that it is neither entrenched or supreme law nor that it did not have 
a specific remedies provision. The Court was able to cast aside the rhetoric that the 
BORA would be limited when it was first enacted in 1990 and are ensuring that they are 
positively protecting these fundamental rights and freedoms that are at the heart of any 
liberal democracy such as New Zealand's. The Court of Appeal did not give in to the 
'austerity of tabulated legalism' .98 
The courts over the years have overseen many cases where a Baigent cause of 
action has been pleaded. 99 Situations that have come before the courts are: 
100 
• Failure to be brought before a Court as soon as possible.
101 
94 Law Commission, Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity: A response to Baigents case and Harvev v 
Derrick (Report 37), 1997. For a critique of The Law Commission's findings see Melanie Smith 
"Burgeoning Baigent?: The Law Commission's Analysis of Baigents Case" (1998) 28 VUWLR 283. 
95 Ashby v White above n 89 per Holt CJ 953-54. 
% Baigent above n 12, per Cooke P, 677. 
97 Per Cartwright J discussing Baigent in Innes v Wong [1996] 3 NZLR 238, 251 . 
98 This statement was first used by Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 
328. 
99 For discussion of how Baigent is applied see R Harrison "Public Law and Private Redress" [1996] NZ 
Law Rev 478. 
100 Compensation is not the only remedy available. There is the exclusion of evidence under the guise of the 
prima facie exclusion rule in Noori: declaratory relief; injunction; stay of proceedings; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Denial of access to counsel. 
102 
Failure to allow submissions to be made with respect to sentence.
103 
Unlawful detention of alleged shoplifters.
104 
Misfeasance in Public Office by District Court Judge. 
105 
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A case of note because of its extraordinary finding with regard to the remedy of 
compensation under Baigent is Kerr v Attorney-General. 
106 K pleaded causes of action 
alleging breach of ss 18 and 22 BORA, in that the Police impeded his travel by stopping 
his car in order to prevent him and his associates from warning an approaching group of 
motorcyclists that the Police were waiting for them. Judge Ryan in the District Court held 
that K's rights had been violated and awarded him token compensation of twenty dollars 
because there was no suggestion of actual or measurable loss. In awarding compensation 
the judge stated: 
It also seems to me that an assessment of damages in these circumstances must endeavour to 
reflect the general standing of a plaintiff in the community .... I must bring to the exercise my 
general knowledge as a citizen and as a Judge sitting in the District Court at Timaru. I do not think 
it too much to say that damages in the case of a clearly decent and law abiding person are likely to 
be greater than in the case of someone who, although his own appearances before the Court may 
have been quite infrequent nonetheless associates with persons who have been convicted of 
serious offences .. . 107 
The Judge went on to list people who K associated with and were described as 
disreputable people in society. This decision is beyond comprehension. To look at whom 
one associates with in determining compensation is clearly wrong. The award of 
compensation is to vindicate the right breached not to reward the person. Where the judge 
may have got this wrong is the fact he referred to damages and not compensation, and so 
101 Whithair v Attorney-Genera/ [1996] 2 NZLR 45. 
102 J v Attorney-Genera/ (1995) 2 HRNZ 311. 
103 Upton v Green (No2) (1996) 3 HRNZ 179. 
104 D M v Attorney-Genera/ ( 1997) 4 HRNZ 258. 
105 Rawlinson v Rice ( 1997) 3 HRNZ 480. Other cases are Police v Anderson (1997) 4 HRNZ 516; 
Warmington v Attorney-Genera/ 17 December 1998, Unreported High Court Auckland, CP455/96; Harris 
v Attorney-Genera/ (23 July 1999) Unreported High Court Masterton CP 7/96. 
106 Kerr v Attorney-Genera/ ( 1996) 4 HRNZ 270. [Kerr] 
107 Kerr above n I 06, 277. 
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believed he could take into account these extraneous factors as you c
an at common law. 
Generally, it is frequently the less popular and accepted members of s
ociety whose rights 
are most in need of protection and vindication by the courts, 
108 but people should not be 
singled out by whom they associate with. Equality before the law, one
 of the keystones of 
the rule of law was not followed here. 
Recently the courts have been grappling with the issue where an actio
n in tort and 
Baigent have been pleaded, is one to take precedence over the other o
r are they to be read 
and decided together. In Manga v Attorney-General Hammond J desc
ribed the difference 
between the two: 
[The] character of a public law [Baigent] claim differs substantiall
y from that of a strictly private 
law claim. The private law proceeding is bipolar (between two part
ies); it is retrospective (it looks 
to events that have already occurred); right and remedy have histor
ically been seen as intertwined; 
the dispute is very much self-contained; and the whole case is still
 essentially partly-initiated and 
controlled. Cases based upon violations of the Bill of Rights are ab
out the vindication of statutory 
policies which are not "just" private: they have overarching, public d
imensions. 109
 
M was detained in prison for an extra 252 days than he should have. H
e pleaded causes of 
action in tort for 'wrongful imprisonment' and in Baigent action f
or being arbitrarily 
detained, breaching s22 BORA. The crown admitted the first c
ause of action and 
Hammond J held under Baigent that the BORA was breached. The 
Judge proceeded to 
award the sum of sixty thousand dollars damages for wrongful im
prisonment. On the 
Baigent action he asked the question 'is there something outsi
de the established 
compensatory heads in tort, which could, and should, result in 
a further award of 
damages to Manga under the New Zealand Bill of Rights?'
110 To this he answered no, 
and to remedy the breach the judge issued a declaration that M was ar
bitrarily detained in 
violation of s 22 BORA. 
So which one of the causes of action is to take precedence over the 
other? Often 
the quantum will be the same under both heads. Should the BORA t
ake primacy and be 
considered and compensation made before anything is awarded at c
ommon law? A full 
108 Harrison in Rights and Freedoms_above n 84, 415 . 
'
09 Manga v Attorney-Genera/ [2000) 2 NZLR 65, para 124-126. [Mang
a] 
110 Manga above n I 09, para 104. 
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bench of the High Court in Attorney-General v Hewitt111 recently concluded that they did 
not regard Cooke P's statement in Baigent as authority for this where the President stated: 
If damages are awarded on causes of action not based on the Bill of Rights, they must be allowed 
for in any award of compensation under the Bill of Rights so that there will be no double recovery. 
A legitimate alternative approach, having the advantage of simplicity, would be to make a global 
award under the Bill of Rights and nominal or concurrent awards on any other successful causes of 
action. 112 
With respect I disagree with the High Court in Hewitt. The BORA should be the primary 
cause of action where there are claims under both heads or an award should be made 
under the BORA at first instance and then follow with the claims in tort. 113 Baigent action 
is a public law remedy for compensation directly against the Crown, and is completely 
different to private law tort action. 114 Rights are enduring and attract great significance 
and if the BORA is to be nothing more than a side show puppet to the common law this 
needs to be promoted. 'We need to portray the moral status of these rights as they are 
representative of universally recognised and enduring values. The BORA is a barrier that 
protects the individual from the state, and the judges as moral guardians of individual 
liberty.' 115 It is not supplementary to the common law and only applied where there is no 
concurrent common law action. 
Support for this vie,w comes from Thomas J in Dun/ea & Others v Attorney-
General. 116 In this case Panckhurst J at first instance in the High Court had awarded 
damages for tort and compensation for breach of the BORA concurrently. Thomas J 
emphasised that the cause of action under the BORA is a public law remedy based on a 
public right, not a vicarious liability in tort. The Crown's liability arises from the fact that 
in affirming fundamental rights in the BORA, the state has undertaken a constitutional 
111 Hewitt above n 82. 
112 Baigent above n 12, 678. 
113 This was the approach taken by Panckhurst J at first instance in Dun/ea & Others v Attorney-General 21 
& 30 November 1998, Unreported High Court, Christchurch, CP 48/96. Case was appealed to the Court of 
Appeal who reduced the amount of the award. Dun/ea v Attorney-General [2000] 3 NZLR 136. The 
majority (Richardson P, Gault Keith and Blanchard JJ) did not discuss which was the more appropriate 
approach tort or BORA as the issue was not canvassed by both sets of counsel, only Thomas J in the 
minority discussed it. 
114 John Miller "Seeking Compensation for Bill of Rights Breaches" (1996) I HRLP 211. 
115 Adams above n 90, 370. 
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obligation to respect, protect and vindicate those rights. ' 11 7 In summation Thomas J 
stated: 
Compensation for a breach of the Bill of Rights therefore embraces the extra dimension of 
vindicating the plaintiffs right, a right which has been vested with an intrinsic value, and it is that 
intrinsic value to the plaintiff for which he or she must be compensated over and above the 
damages which the common law torts have traditionally attracted. 
118 
The intrinsic value of rights is not to be disposed of easily and is the true essence of what 
rights jurisprudence is about. 
B. Tort. 
Tort law is largely judge made law developed over many years taking into account 
changes in society and society's attitudes and is a clear example of the common law at 
work. 119 The common law is subject to the BORA and is read in conjunction with it.
120 
This comes from s 3(a) where the BORA applies to acts done by the 'judicial branches of 
the government'. Decisions to recognise this principle are SG v Radio NZ 
121 and Duff v 
Communicado. 122 A more definitive statement came from the current Chief Justice Sian 
Elias when she was sitting as the judge of first instance in the well known defamation 
case Lange v Atkinson. 123 In a substantial discussion of the law of defamation and the 
interaction between the common law and s 14 BORA she held: 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is important contemporary legislation which is directly 
relevant to the policies served by the common law of defamation. It is idle to suggest that the 
116 Dun/ea & Others v Attorney-General [2000] 3 NZLR 136. [Dun/ea] 
11 7 Dun/ea above n 116, para 56. 
118 Dun/ea above n 116, para 67. 
119 For example the tort of nuisance that developed the separate tort rule under Rylands v Fletcher (1868) 
LR 3 HL 330 . 
120 Other cases in tort that have considered the BORA are Thomas v Attorney-General (1 April 1996) 
Unreported High Court Auckland CP 136/95; Attorney-Genera/for England & Wales v Television New 
Zealand (1998) 44 IPR 123. 
121 SG v Radio NZ above n 39 discussed in the section on Procedure. 
122 Duff above n 41 discussed in the section on Procedure. 
123 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC). [Lange HC] 
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common law need not conform to the judgments in such legislation. They are authoritative as to 
where the convenience and welfare of society lies.
124 
The Court of Appeal agreed with Elias J broadly for the same reasons expressed at first 
instance. 125 The Court emphasised that in looking at the law of defamation certain 
realities of New Zealand's social and political context need to be taken into account as 
well as the BORA. Blanchard J commented on the significance of the BORA:
126 
[With] its emphasis on protecting public processes, notably political processes, by its affirmation 
of the right to vote in genuine periodic elections of members of the House of Representatives by 
equal suffrage and to be a candidate, and the rights of freedom of expression .... freedom of 
assembly and freedom of association, and the right to justice. The central role of democracy is also 
emphasised in the recognition in s 5 that any limit on a recognised freedom has to be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.
127 
The Lange (CA 1998) decision was the culmination of a trio of significant cases that had 
looked at the interaction between defamation and the BORA. In Television New Zealand 
Ltd v Quinn 128 a jury awarded (in two separate claims) a total of one and a half million 
dollars in damages for what was considered defamation of the worst kind. The High 
Court judge threw out the finding with regard to the second claim and the damages were 
reduced to four hundred thousand. In the Court of Appeal McKay J stated: 
I am not persuaded that the Bill of Rights has the result of putting media freedoms above the right 
to one' s reputation, nor that this case has anything to do with the proper freedom of the media, as 
distinct from a license to be irresponsible. 
129 
124 Lange (HC) above n 123, 32. 
125 Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, 428 (CA 1998). [Lange CA 1998] 
126 The case was appealed to the Privy Council [2000] I NZLR 257, on question of law in the development 
of the defence of Qualified Privilege with regard to political discussion. The Privy Council directed the 
Court of Appeal to reconsider their decision in light of the English case of Reynolds v Times Newspapers 
Ltd [ 1999] 3 WLR IOI 0. The most recent Court of Appeal again only mentions that the BORA is part of 
New Zealand's constitutional structure, Lange v Atkinson (21 June 2000) Unreported Court of Appeal CA 
52/97. 
127 Lange (CA 1998) above n 125,464. 
128 Television New Zealandv Quinn [1996] 3 NZLR 24 (Cooke P, Richardson, Gault, McKay and 
McGechan JJ). Brief facts are that TVNZ broadcast on the Holmes show allegations Quinn was involved in 
horse doping, selling performance enhancing drugs and financial irregularities at the Auckland Trotting 
Club. [TVNZ v Quinn] 
129 TVNZv Quinn above n 128, 45. 
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The third case Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd130 involved an allegation that A 
had 'body snatched' the body of the deceased Maori comedian Billy T James. A stated he 
was acting in accordance with Maori custom when he took the body away, and that the 
term used was a defamatory comment on Maori custom. Hammond J at first instance held 
that this was fair comment and justified, even though there was a sharp clash of cultural 
values.131 The Court of Appeal in discussion of the BORA and defamation observed: 
The criticism made of [A's] conduct by means of referring to him as body snatching was not 
directed at why the body was taken, but at the manner in which it occurred .... [provided] that 
comment is factually based and expresses a genuinely-held opinion rather than being mere 
invective, it will be protected in a defamation action by the fair comment or honest opinion 
defence. The insensitivity of the comment does not deprive it of that protection if it is made 
honestly. That the jury or judge may personally disagree is an irrelevant consideration. If it were 
otherwise, freedom of expression, a right affirmed by s 14 of the BORA, would be seriously in 
jeopardy. 132 
The three decisions demonstrate the importance of taking into account 'Freedom of 
Expression' when applying and adapting the law of defamation found in the common 
law. The BORA is not stuck in some time warp and with the common law acknowledges 
changes in society's values and expectations. 133 They both are applied with an eye to the 
future. Defamation law can only go from strength to strength now s 14 is part of the 
equation. 
Exemplary damages are another area of tort that has had significant BORA 
decisions. Two deserve mention. The first S v G134 the Court of Appeal declared they 
would not read down s 26(2) of the BORA and allow a claim for exemplary damages 
130 Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 590 (CA) (Richardson P, Gault, Thomas, Keith 
and Blanchard JJ).[Awa] 
131 Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd. [1995] 3 NZLR 701 (HC). 
132 Awa above n 130, 595-6. Note Thomas J did not endorse this comment but agreed with the outcome of 
the case. 
133 Other defamation cases include: Auckland Area Health Board v Television New Zealand [1992] 3 NZLR 
406; TV3 Network v Eveready New Zealand [1993] 3 NZLR 435; Television New Zealandv Prebble [1993] 
3 NZLR 513; Matson v Television New Zealand 27 September 1995, Unreported High Court Auckland CP 
438/95; 
134 S v G [1995] 3 NZLR 681. [S v G] The case involved S suing for damages after G had already been 
convicted of numerous sexual offences. 
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once someone had already been punished by the criminal courts. Gault J held within a 
discussion of the Limitation Act 1950: 
Double punishment by the award of exemplary damages after the imposition of a criminal 
sentence for the same conduct has implications beyond those involved in assessing an application 
for leave under s4 (7) of the Limitation Act. To permit this would require reading down s 26(2) of 
the Bill of Rights Act to confine the second punishment to that of a criminal nature. We are not 
persuaded that we should do that, particularly since the criminal court is required to consider 
reparation in all cases. 135 
The second Daniels v Thompson136involved three plaintiffs suing for exemplary damages 
after the conclusion of criminal trials where two of the defendants had already been 
convicted and one had been acquitted. Looking at whether the actions were barred 
because of s 26 the court held: 
Clearly s 26(1) is referable and only referable to criminal proceedings. Logically, it would seem to 
follow subs (2) is to be read in the same way. Subsection (2) prohibits trial for an offence which 
has already been the subject of an acquittal or conviction .... What is prohibited is a further trial 
for the same offence, that is a trial which also may result in an acquittal or a conviction. The 
provision is not concerned with a trial which may result in a form of civil liability. It has never 
been the law that a criminal prosecution will bar civil proceedings based on the same facts which 
gave rise to the prosecution. 137 
The Court held that allowing exemplary damages where they followed on from the 
criminal process was another form of punishment and they would be barred because of an 
abuse of process. 138 The court does not want multiple criminal punishments and that is 
what the exemplary damages are seen as in these cases. What the Court will allow is the 
imposition of monetary penalties in civil proceedings for false tax returns, which does not 
prevent a later criminal prosecution for the same offence. 139 
135 S v G above n 134, 692. 
136 Daniels v Thompson [1998] 3 NZLR 22. [Daniels] All cases involved sexual offences. Discussion on the 
case: J Manning "Daniels v Thompson: Double Punishment or Double Trouble?" [1998] NZ Law Rev 721 . 
137 Daniels above n 136, 33. 
138 See also the cases of P v P [ 1993] OCR 843; 0 v U (1996) 14 CRNZ 76; G v G [1997] NZFLR 49; 
139 These were the facts and result in Case S67 ( 1996) 17 NZTC 7,417. 
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X. Administrative Law. 
In administrative law the BORA has played a major role especially through application of 
s 27 ' Right to Justice'. It is little wonder that the BORA is submitted in a great deal of 
cases that deal with administrative law principles and the application of judicial 
• 140 review. 
Recently it came as no surprise to see Hammond J in Lumber Specialties Ltd v 
Hodgson 141 observe: 
I have no doubt that s 27(1) is an exceptionally important provision in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights. Surprisingly little use has been made of it in civil litigation in general. Unfortunately, the 
section has suffered the fate of most constitutional provisions of that kind, in being one of the first 
ports of call for bleary-eyed drunken drivers, and their counsel. The Bar has routinely overlooked 
the substantive possibilities in the section. 
142 
Judicial review proceedings were issued against the government when there was a change 
in policy of the logging of the West Coast beech forests and a milling contract worth 
millions of dollars was cancelled. 
What the judge is alerting to, is the fact submissions are made without a thought 
to the correct application of the section. An analogy of a 'bleary-eyed drunken driver' 
may not be far from the truth. Counsel need to become aware of the full implication of s 
27. They cannot go on a hit and miss mission hoping that somehow the enigma of what 
exactly natural justice is will see them win the case. 
140 Paki v Maori Land Court (17 June 1999) Unreported High Court Hamilton, M270/98; Lowry v Social 
Security Appeal Authority (6 May 1999) Unreported High Court Auckland Ml663/98; Down v Van de 
Wetering (1999] NZAR 302; Bulmer v Attorney-General (1998) 12 PRNZ 316; Director of Proceedings v 
Nursing Council of New Zealand (7 December 1998) Unreported High Court Auckland M774/98; Staite v 
Psychologists (1997) 11 PRNZ l; Dagger v Department of Internal Affairs (29 October 1997) Unreported 
High Court Wellington AP 317/97; Voss v Minister of Agriculture (5 May 1997) Unreported High Court 
Auckland M450/97; Colin Geddes v Wellington Regional Council (1996) 3 HRNZ 220; Cooper v Attorney-
General (1996] 3 NZLR 480; lungulescu v Attorney-General (1996] DCR 823; Ankers v Attorney-General 
(1995] 2 NZLR 595; Peters v Collinge (1993] 2 NZLR 554; Byers v Auckland Area Health Board (16 
February 1993) Unreported High Court Auckland. 
141 lumber Specialties Ltd v Hodgson [2000] 2 NZLR 347. [lumber Specialties] 
142 lumber Specialties above n 141, 373 para 168. 
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Other observations made by Hammond J concerned whether s 27 may 'justify the 
development of a "takings" jurisprudence to protect private property interests ' .
143 The 
notion being there had been a market created for these beech logs and now the contract 
had been taken out from them from under their feet. In the event he held, the Court could 
not delve into areas of policy formulation that had been decided by those elected to 
public office. 144 This is correct as the courts do labour under accusations of judicial 
activism in areas that are considered Parliaments domain. Hammond J held that the 
Ministers did not act illegally, so there is no way the decision could be reviewed. BORA 
jurisprudence encompasses many factual situations. All action by the state that affects 
individuals can be subject to the BORA. Whether property rights of citizens can fall 
under the umbrella of the BORA will be left to another day, but suffice to say the door 
has been left ajar. 
Many administrative law cases deal with the question of whether the decision-
maker is subject to judicial review, and if the BORA applies to the decision making 
body. 145 Section 3 (b) BORA is applied.146 In three cases a divergent approach to the 
issue emerged. In Federated Farmers of New Zealand v New Zealand Post
147 farmers 
asked for a review of the decision by New Zealand Post to double the amount of the rural 
delivery service fee (RDSF). They submitted this unduly restricted s 14 BORA. NZ Post 
claimed it was a reasonable limit under s 5. McGechan Jin the High Court observed from 
Noort that the BORA needs to be applied in a generous and purposive way and went onto 
conclude on the question of applicability to NZ Post under s 3 (b ): 
143 Lumber Specialties above n 141 , 374 para 171-178. Hammond J is clearly aware of the potential of the 
BORA and that its scope is unlimited. For a discussion on the BORA and property rights see A Butler "The 
Scope of s 21 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990: Does it Provide a General Guarantee of Property Rights?" 
[1996] NZLJ 58. 
144 Lumber Specialties above n 141 , 375 para 184. 
145 Discussion on the issue can be found in M Chen "Judicial Review of State-Owned Enterprises at the 
Crossroads" (1994) 24 VUWLR 51; P Radich & R Best "Section 3 of the Bill of Rights" [1997] NZLJ 251 ; 
and N Patel "An Excursion Through Three Bee Valley: The Application of the Bill of Rights to Tranz Rail" 
(1999) 5 HRLP 174. 
146 Other cases to look at s 3 (b) are Re "Penthouse (US)" Vol 19, No 5 and Ors [1991] NZAR 289; 
Sharma v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd 3 NZBORR 183; Queen Street Backpackers Ltd v Commerce 
Commission (1994) 2 HRNZ 94; Sheehan v Valuers Registration Board (1998] DCR 159. 
147 Federated Farmers of New Zealandv New Zealand Post [1999-92] 3 NZBORR 339. [Federated 
Farmers] 
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A case can be made that [NZ Post] is merely a private company, which carries out postal functions 
under contracts with private users ... I have no difficulty regarding mail handling as a "public 
function". It is carried out for the public, in the public interest, and moreover by a company which 
while technically a separate entity presently is wholly owned and ultimately controlled by the 
Crown: a "State-Owned Enterprise". For Bill of Rights Purposes and as an ordinary use of 
language NZ Post can and should be regarded as exercising "public functions".
148 
The BORA must apply. We are concerned with the nature of the power and not the 
source of the power. 149 Farmers' rights to 'Freedom of Expression' must be taken into 
account and it is taking a narrow interpretation of the BORA to hold that the RDSF was 
not restricting their rights under s 14. 
McGechan J went on to hold that the RDSF was a justified limitation. The 
commercial practicalities needed to be looked as well as the fact that the imposition of 
the fee would not impede s 14. 'It is reasonable, and within the parameters of the 
justifiable in a free and democratic society to impose a degree of user pays even upon 
essential services he concluded.' 15
0 The practical realities of BORA jurisprudence 
succeeded. A legalistic view is not always called for but a degree of pragmatism. 
· Realistically the fee was not unduly harsh. 
In contrast to this decision (though not directly an administrative law case) is 
Television New Zealand v Newsmonitor Services. 
151 TVNZ was suing for breach of 
copyright N ewsmonitor who were recording news programmes and disseminating 
relevant information for clients, who would make use of the transcripts in their areas of 
interest. Newsmonitor submitted TVNZ's action was a restriction of s 14 BORA. 
Blanchard J thought little of this argument and concluded: 
As a state enterprise [TVNZ], has a principal objective to operate as a successful business as laid 
down by s 4 [State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986] but acts done by it in pursuance of that objective 
are not acts done in perfonnance of a 'public function power or duty' so as to bring in to play the 
Bill of Rights. 152 
148 Federated Farmers above n 147, 394. 
149 See Radich & Best "Section 3" above n 145, 253. 
15° Federated Farmers above n 147, 395. 
151 Television New Zealand v Newsmonitor Services [1994) 2 NZLR 91. [Newsmonitor] 
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Blanchard J went down a different track to McGechan Jin Federated Farmers , which did 
not come without some criticism.
153 When making a public function enquiry of 
organisations, the key is to look at the nature of the power and not the source. What is it 
that they actually do and provide? The crux of the matter is that corporatised or privatised 
bodies are a new type of institution which have sprung from the new social and economic 
functions of Government in the eighties and nineties and may not fit into the traditional 
notion of Government proper. 154 Clearly TVNZ is providing a public function and 
Newsmonitor should be allowed to use the service as they please. 
Further reinforcement of the Federated Farmers line of reasoning is Lawson v 
Housing New Zealand. 155 Lawson pleaded a breach of s 8 'Right to Life' because 
Housing New Zealand was introducing market rents for state houses tenants. On the 
question of the BORA's applicability to Housing NZ Williams J endorsed the view of 
McGechan J and observed: 
The fact that a particular body is essentially private in nature does not of itself obviate compliance 
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. In this context the remarks of the Privy Council in 
[Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand LtdJ
156 are instructive when 
considering how public are Housing New Zealand's functions in the present case. Pursuant to s 3 
the act done, the increasing of rent, does not need to be public provided it is done in the 
performance of a public function power or duty. 
157 
Williams J found he did not need to reach a conclusion on this point as he held that there 
had been no breach of s 8. He concluded: 
It requires an unduly strained interpretation of s 8 itself to conclude market rent for 
accommodation without regard to affordability and impact on the tenant's living standards. Suffice 
to say there are strong policy arguments in favour of their exclusion . ... even if the . conduct 
complained of had prima facie been held to be within the scope of s 8, it is also within reasonable 
limits demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
158 
152 Newsmonitor above n 151, 96. 
153 See Patel above n 145, 177. 
154 Patel above n 145, 178. 
155 Lawson v Housing New Zealand [1997] 2 NZLR 474. [Lawson] 
156 Mercury Energy v ECNZ [1994] 2 NZLR 385, 388. 
157 Lawson above n 155,492. 
158 Lawson above n 155, 494-6. 
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The argument unsuccessfully run had more to do with economic and social factors that 
affect rights, which were deliberately left out of the White Paper. It is an area of the law 
that involves the making of policy, best left to the legislature. An area of the law, courts 
have generally avoided. 
Finally we come to McGuinn v Board of Trustees of Palmerston North Boys ' 
High School. 159 It is an unfortunate case involving the interaction of the BORA and 
judicial review. M had been suspended from boarding school and pleaded along with the 
usual writs of judicial review breach of s 27 BORA. Goddard J in a judgment which has 
been widely criticised 160 held that the BORA cannot apply because on the judicial review 
ground there was no statutory power of decision being made therefore as well there was 
no exercise of a public function. She concluded the boarding establishment was totally 
separate from the school and so did not come under the Education Act 1989. The decision 
to suspend the boy was not reviewable. 
Patel in his article observed that Goddard J looked at the case through the lens of 
judicial review and not through the separate eyes of s 3 (b) BORA, as if the tests were the 
same. 161 The applicability tests of judicial review and the BORA are different as different 
acts govern the rules. The Judicature Amendment Act 1972 uses the term 'statutory 
power of decision conferred by or under an act' whereas the BORA uses 'public function 
conferred or imposed pursuant to law'. Through judicial review a litigant can only assert 
a review of the procedural aspects of administrative or executive actions, and under the 
BORA a litigant is asserting a substantive right.
162 
Can the argument be made that natural justice in judicial review and under the 
BORA is the same? Natural justice is natural justice no matter what context is used 
perhaps. No, that is like comparing apples and pears. Applying the test under 
administrative law and the BORA is fundamentally (as was explained in the previous 
paragraph) different. To compare, the tort of wrongful imprisonment is similar to a 
breach of s 22 'Right not to be Arbitrarily Detained' as both can be explained as holding 
159 McGuinn v Palmerston North Boys' High School [ 1997] 2 NZLR 60. [McGuinn] 
160 Radich and Best "Section 3" above n 145,254; Patel above n 145, 178-9. 
161 Patel above n 145, 178. 
162 Patel above n 145, 179. 
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someone against their will. 163 What we are concerned with is the right and that a breach 
of it is vindicated. With natural justice the terminology may be the same but the 
semantics of it are not. 
Realistically it would not be unusual to see the Courts determining there is no 
difference between the two. If the litigant will succeed under administrative law natural 
justice then they will likely succeed under s 27 BORA as well.
164 
XI. Constitutional Law. 
The next section deals with cases that do not fall under any general area of the law but 
involve specific rights in the BORA. 
A. Freedom of Expression. 
Freedom of expression found in s 14 is the section that has developed a significant 
amount of its own jurisprudence. Numerous cases cite s 14, and as has already been seen 
the fact situations vary. Cases already discussed above are Zdrahal, 
165 Christchurch 
International Airport, 166 Duff v Communicado, 167 SG v Radio NZ, 
168 NP ANZ, 169 and 
Lange. 170 
Two recent cases to come before the Court of Appeal in fact have strengthened 
the right to freedom of expression. The first Moonen v Film and Literature Board of 
Review171 is a landmark case. Briefly the facts are that Mr. Moonen challenged the 
classifying of a book and photographs as objectionable under s 3 (2) of the Films, Videos 
163 Both causes of action were pleaded in Manga above n I 09. 
164 Cases that have run both arguments Nash v Nelson District Court (I O April 2000) High Court Nelson 
CP 23/99; Bakker v District Court at Te Awamutu (6 August 1999) High Court Hamilton CP 35/99; Wilson 
v New Zealand Customs Service (12 May 1999) Unreported High Court Auckland M 411 & 412/98; 
165 Zdrahal v Wellington City Council above n 17. 
166 ChCh International above n 20. 
167 Duffv Communicado above n 41. 
168 Solicitor v General v Radio NZ above n 39. 
169 NPANZv Family Court above n 71. 
110 Lange CA 1998 above n 125. 
171 Moonen above n 14. 
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and Literature Classification Act 1993 .172 He claimed the Board of Review failed to apply 
the act consistently with the right to freedom of expression in the BORA. The Board had 
followed the High Court decision in News Media Ltd v Film and Literature Board of 
Review. 173 The Court of Appeal disapproved of the holding in News Media and made 
three significant findings in the case. 
Firstly, it again emphasised that a BORA consistent approach is required which 
impinges as little as possible on freedom of expression. Tipping J for the court held: 
It is inevitable in a censorship context that some limit will be placed on freedom of expression, but 
the combined effect of ss 5 and 6 of the [BORA] results in a need to put on the words "promotes 
or supports" such available meaning as impinges as little as possible on freedom of expression.174 
An application that favours freedom of expression over objectionability is required if the 
case is marginal. These statements build on the growing jurisprudence of s 14 BORA and 
makes it clear (as it should be in any liberal democracy) that freedom of expression is a 
paramount right that cannot be extinguished easily. 
Second the court laid down a five-step process to implement when interpreting 
another statute in light of the BORA, where it is perceived that the act prohibits or 
abrogates a right. The approach set out by the court is comparable to the Canadian case R 
v Oakes175 that set out similar procedures when interpreting legislation in light of the 
Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms. Summarised from Moonen they are:
176 
I. Identify the different interpretations of the words of the act. 
2. If more than one interpretation is possible select the one that least limits the right. 
3. Identify the extent to which the meaning limits the right. 
4. Can the limitation be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in terms of s 
5? The limitation must be justifiable in light of the objective of the act. A value judgment 
is required. 
5. The Court needs to indicate whether the limitation is justified. 
172 The operative words of the section provide that "A publication shall be deemed objectionable ... if the 
publication promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support." There is then a list of categories such as 
the exploitation of children, violence combined with sexual activity and bestiality to name a few. 
173 News Media v Film and Literature Board of Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 410. 
174 Moonen above n 14, para 27. 
175 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 210. 
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The Court in this instance cleared up the relationship of the interpretation provisions ss 4, 
5 and 6 of the BORA which had not been that clear considering the divergent approaches 
to came out of Noort. The interpretation provisions all have a role to play. This case will 
be of extreme importance for the future use of the BORA in years to come, with these 
clear guidelines set out. 
Thirdly the Court gave an indication albeit obiter that s 5: 
[Necessarily] involves the Court having the power, and on occasions the duty, to indicate that 
although a statutory provision must be enforced according to its proper meaning, it is inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights, in that it constitutes an unreasonable limitation on the relevant right or 
freedom which cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
177 
This is the New Zealand equivalent (though termed as an indication to the legislature and 
not a declaration of inconsistency) of the courts being able to strike down inconsistent 
legislation as they can in the United States and Canada. This was not envisaged by 
Parliament and was one of the reasons why the BORA never became supreme law as they 
saw this as an affront to parliamentary supremacy .178 They gave the courts only an 
interpretative function. One academic commentator had alluded to the fact that there is 
nothing in the BORA to prevent the courts from doing this and even stated that the 
BORA as a whole arguably requires it to be so. 179 An indication would be a message to 
Parliament from the judiciary that they are critical of or disapprove of an enactment 
because it is an unreasonable limitation on the BORA. Andrew Butler sees this as a 
significant new weapon for the BORA, which could have implications for the 
constitutional arrangements ofNew Zealand.
180 
It can be argued that it is not appropriate to give the courts this power. ' Parliament 
1s comprised of people who are democratically elected and who have to submit 
176 In full, the discussion is found at Moonen above n 14, para 16-19. 
177 Moonen above n 14, para 20. 
178 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand "The White Paper" above n 9. The BORA would have been supreme, 
and the court would have had the power to declare legislation invalid, 22-3 & 40-1 . 
179 F M Brookfield "Constitutional Law" [1992] NZ Recent LR 231 , 239. 
180 A Butler "Judicial Indications oflnconsistency - A New Weapon in the Bill of Rights Armoury?" 
[2000] NZ Law Rev 43 , 44 . [Butler "Judicial Indications"] See also for discussion of the case P Rishworth 
"Human Rights" [ 1999) NZ Law Rev 457. 
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themselves to the electorate. Judges are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice 
of the appropriate Minister and cannot be removed from office except for gross 
misbehaviour.' 181 This is skirting around the issues. How else are the courts to enforce 
that the rights contained in the BORA are sacrosanct and cannot be overridden by 
inconsistent legislation easily .182 We must recall the long title where the BORA was 
enacted to affirm protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
The problem with an indication termed this way is that it is a polite way of telling 
Parliament that an act is an unreasonable limitation. Parliament does not have to do 
anything, in fact they can ignore it. Recently the Court of Appeal has had to grapple with 
the issue of indications or declarations in the criminal case R v Poumako. 
183 Retrospective 
legislation was enacted by Parliament that altered the sentencing conditions of P who was 
convicted of armed robbery and murder. He was sentenced under new 'home invasion' 
legislation, which called for a different sentencing regime to the one in place, when he 
committed the crime. This was in direct conflict with s 25 (g). 
The Court held unanimously that the new legislation was inconsistent with 
established principle. The majority held that the sentence imposed would have been 
justified in any event and so declined to consider whether to make a declaration of 
inconsistency as they did not hear full argument. Thomas J was vehement in dissent and 
wished to make a declaration of inconsistency. He held: 
[The legislation] is incompatible with the cardinal tenets of a liberal democracy. This Court would 
be compromising its judicial function if it did not alert Parliament in the strongest possible manner 
to the constitutional privation of this provision.
184 
Rights in the BORA need to be vindicated and given full effect; Parliament needed to be 
told this. 185 
181 White Paper above n 9, 40. 
182 For full discussion of arguments in favour of judicial indications of inconsistency see Butler "Judicial 
Indications" above n 180, 49-51. And arguments against, 52-55. 
183 R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (Richardson P, Gault Henry and Keith JJ, Thomas J dissenting). 
[Poumako] 
184 Poumako above n 183, 710. 
185 The issue of declarations is due to come before a full bench of seven of the Court of Appeal in the case 
R v Pora. 
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The second case to look at freedom of expression is Living Word Distributors v 
Human Rights Action Group. 186 The facts briefly are, that the Film and Literature Board 
of Review classified two videos as objectionable under s 3 of the Films, Videos and 
Publications Classification Act 1993 (FVPCA). One video discussed the connection 
between Aids and homosexuality, the other video discussed the opposition to the granting 
of the same civil rights to homosexuals as other minority groups under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 187 The videos can be described as 
provocative and advocate extremist views on the subject of Aids and homosexuals. At 
issue was the High Courts application of the BORA, in that s 19 'Freedom from 
Discrimination' was brought into consideration with s 14 'Freedom of Expression.' The 
High Court saw the s 14 right as clashing with s 19 and thus this modified the application 
of s 14. In effect the High Court had ruled s 19 prevailed over s 14. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed and held: 
The inquiry [under s 3(1) FVPCA) is whether the depiction in the videos of a qualifying subject 
matter (such as sex) is in such a manner that the availability of the publication is likely to be 
injurious to the public good. At that point s 14 must be given full weight in the application of s 
3(1 ), but s 19 does not apply directly . . . . [in] terms of the statutory scheme [ of the FVPCA] there 
is no direct clash of rights.188 
Section 14 is the primary right to consider when interpreting the FVPCA. The act is 
directed at censorship (regulation of free speech) not the prevention of discrimination. 
This decision once again gives guidance on the correct approach when dealing 
with legislation that inhibits free speech. The decision is a victory for free speech but 
only with regards to the interpretation of the FVPCA and its interaction with the BORA. 
The Court did not have to determine themselves whether banning the videos was an 
unreasonable limitation, that would be left to the board after looking solely at s· 14 and 
186 Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (31 August 2000) Unreported Court of Appeal 
CA 58/00. [living Word] An earlier case that looked at the similar issue of the clash betweens 14 and 19 is 
Proceedings Commissioner v Archer (1996) 3 HRNZ 123. 
187 This amendment protects the rights of minority groups. 
188 living Word above n 186, para 40-1 per Richardson P writing for Gault Keith and Tipping JJ. Thomas J 
wrote a separate concurring judgment. 
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not s 19 as they had. There was an error in the application of the law and the decision was 
remitted back to the Board for reconsideration. 
Other cases to deal with freedom of expression in the civil jurisdiction concern; 
principle of open justice with respect to suppression orders and orders prohibiting the 
publication of trial proceedings; 189 application to seek access to police video 
interviews; 190 Search of media organisations to obtain video evidence for potential 
prosecution; 191 application to the Copyright Act 1962; 192 comparative advertising and the 
Trade Marks Act 1953; 193 appeal against requirement to enter into a bond to keep the 
peace; 194 use of internet domain names; 195 and other censorship classification cases. 196 
B. Freedom of Assembly. 
Freedom of assembly found in s 16 has already been discussed in Kapiti Coast District 
Council v Raika. 197 The section helps enforce the right of people to protest as was the 
case in Police v Beggs. 198 Students had marched to Parliament grounds protesting against 
tertiary education reforms. The protest was peaceful and the Speaker conveyed a message 
through a representative, the Police and other students that the protestors had to leave. 
Many refused and seventy-five were arrested for trespass. It was submitted that there was 
a breach of ss 14-18 BORA and a stay of the prosecutions was sought. The two specific 
rights at issue were freedom of expression and assembly. 
Gendall Jin a discussion covering some of the more significant BORA cases
199 
held that the right of the Speaker as occupier of Parliament grounds to exercise those 
189 TV3 Network Services v R [ 1993] 3 NZLR 421; R v Bain (1996) 3 HRNZ 108; R v H (I'304!95) (1996) 3 
HRNZ 476; A v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] NZAR 428. 
190 R v Pora [application by TVNZ Ltd to search Court Record} (1996) 3 HRNZ 364. 
191 Television New Zealand Ltd v Attorney-General [1995] 2 NZLR 641. 
192 Television New Zealand Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91. 
193 PC Direct Ltd v Best Buy Ltd [1997] 2 NZLR 723. 
194 Bracanov v Moss (1995) 2 HRNZ 319. 
195 Oggi Advertising v McKenzie [1999] I NZLR 63 I. 
196 Re "Penthouse (US)" [1990-92] I NZBORR 429; Re Various Comics [1992] NZAR 26; Re Final F.xit 
[1993] NZAR 122; Society for the Protection of Community Standards v Waverley International [1993] 2 
NZLR 709; Re "People" [1993] NZAR 543; Re High Times (1997) 4 HRNZ 437. 
197 Raika above n 23 . 
198 Police v Beggs [1999] 3 NZLR 615. [Beggs] 
199 Full bench of High Court with Wild J. BORA discussed at Beggs above n 198, 625-32. The cases 
covered include Noori, Baigent, and Quilter. 
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rights had to be done in a manner consistent with the BORA. The court focussed on the 
words of the Trespass Act 1980 and applied s 6 to obtain a consistent interpretation. 'The 
right of the occupier to warn could be given a meaning consistent with s 16 right of 
assembly by an application of the standard of reasonableness. The Trespass Act limits s 
16 and so the limit must be reasonable in terms of s 5 .' 
200The test of reasonableness 
required would depend on the circumstances of each case. Here it was not reasonable and 
the prosecutions were stayed. 
The reasonableness test Gendall J applied on the limit to freedom of assembly is 
unfortunate.201 A more appropriate test would have been if the limit were demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. A proportionality test could then be applied 
also which is much stronger than reasonableness. Using reasonableness implies that they 
are looking at the limit on the BORA in administrative law terms not its own terms. The 
court is getting the two mixed up. Reasonableness allows a degree of subjectivity to be 
applied in cases where it should be more of an objective standard. The potential of the 
BORA is not being realised and courts are still looking at it in secondary terms to other 
areas of the law. 
c. Right to Life. 
The right to life has already been looked at in the family case Re J (An Infant). 
202 The 
case of Short/and v North/and Health203 saw an elderly patient with kidney disease 
refused further dialysis treatment because he did not meet the adopted medical criteria. It 
was submitted that this was a breach of the patient's right not to be deprived of life. The 
Court of Appeal acknowledged that s 8 BORA states the fundamental principle of the 
sanctity of life and is the right on which all others depend but it is not absolute. 
204 The 
court concluded that looking at the context of the case, the medical assessment was done 
over many weeks, considered the medical history of the patient and involved specialists 
200 Beggs above n 198, 627. 
201 The test that determines whether the limit on the right is reasonable was also used in Bradfordv Police 
(1995) 2 HRNZ 405. 
202 Re J above n 66. 
'03 • Short/and v North/and Health [1998] I NZLR 433. [ShortlandJ 
204 Short/and above n 203, 444. 
45 
from all over the country. This reasoned decision to deny medical treatment could not be 
considered a breach of the right to life. 
This case involved difficult subject matter considering the facts. A harsh but 
correct decision had to be made. A BORA argument had to be tried and because it was it 
illustrates the unlimited potential of the BORA and the multitude of factual situations that 
it can be applied to. 
D. Manifestation of Religion and Belief. 
Mendelssohn v Attorney-Genera/
205 involved a member of a religious group issuing 
proceedings against the crown in respect of the Attorney-General's acts and omissions 
concerning the religious trust. The trust alleged the Attorney-General failed to take 
positive steps to protect their freedom of religion.
206 'The Court of Appeal held that the 
BORA contains rights that impose positive duties on the State and those that impose 
negative duties. Most of the rights in the BORA do not impose a duty on the state to 
enforce the right, rather the state cannot breach or interfere with the right. '
207 There was 
no way it could be said the Attorney-General was under a duty to protect their freedom of 
religion. 
This case illustrates the dilemma that some litigants find themselves in where 
their idea of what the BORA protects is not what they thought it was. It is the individual 
that is under the positive duty to protect their rights by issuing proceedings where the 
state has acted in breach of the right. If the state has not dome anything, what is it that 
they are trying to vindicate. This decision helps illustrate that the BORA is still only in its 
infancy in New Zealand and the courts and the legal profession still have a way to go to 
work out the scope flexibility and full potential of the BORA. 
XII. Conclusion. 
205 Mendelssohn v Attorney-General [ 1999] 2 NZLR 268. [Mendelssohn] 
206 Two additional cases that looks at freedom of religion is Feau v Department of Social Welfare (1995) 2 
HRNZ 528; Mabon v The Conference of the Methodist Church of New Zealand [1997] ERNZ 690. 
207 Mendelssohn above n 205, 273 . 
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This paper has looked at major areas of the law that have applied the BORA. The BORA 
still has a long way to reach its full potential but in mitigation the BORA is still in its 
infancy. Many courts and judges have been slow to embrace the BORA and have been 
content to rest on their laurels, using existing legislation and the common law. Some 
haven't been applying this still relatively new document that has an eye to the future. 
They are more comfortable with the common law. It has been around longer and it is 
much safer to adhere to the principle of precedent than deal with the BORA. 
Litigants need to be more aware of the scope of the BORA and the role it has to 
play in contemporary New Zealand Society. Some of its potential is unfulfilled. Thought 
needs to be given on how to argue breaches properly. Hit and miss missions that are often 
attempted do not do the area of rights jurisprudence any favours. 
As this paper has illustrated, the range of cases considering the BORA is vast. 
Cases have varied and been similar in their approach to this constitutional document. Not 
all cases have been satisfactory in their approach that emphasised the importance of and 
the need to vindicate rights in the BORA. Not all sections of the BORA have been 
covered in this paper, as the scope of the rights and what it actually entails has not been 
fully utilised but their day will come.
208 
We may have to wait another ten years for the BORA to reach its full potential. 
The wait will be worth it. 
End Note. Regrettably it is logical to assume that some cases that have considered the 
BORA have been left out, or have been cited but not discussed. All I can plead to· this is 
mea culpa. 
208 For examples 10 'Right not to be Subjected to Medical or Scientific Experimentation' and s 20 'Rights 
of Minorities' . Section 20 was briefly looked at in Te Runanga O Whare Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General 
-Alt Cite Sealords (12 October 1992) Unreported High Court Wellington CP 682/92, CP 762/88. The case 
was appealed but the BORA issue was not raised, [1993] 2 NZLR 301. 
1990, No. 109 New Zealand Bill of Rights 
1990, No. 109 
An Act--
(a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
New Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 
[28 August 1990 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1. SHORT TITLE AND COl\11\'IENCEMENT--
(l) This Act may be cited as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the 28th day after the date on which it 
receives the Royal assent . 
.PART I -- GENERAL PROVISIONS 
2. RIGHTS AFFIR.tVIED--
The rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights are affirmed. 
3. APPLICATION--
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done--
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or 
duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
4. OTHER ENACThlENTS NOT AFF.ECTED--
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or 
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or 
to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment--
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights. 
5 .. JUSTIFIED LllVIIT ATIONS--
Subject to section 4 of this Brfl of Rights, the rights and freedoms contai
ned in 
this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescrib
ed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
6. INTERPRETATION CONSISTENT \VITI-I BILL OF RIGHTS TO BE PREFER
RED--
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with 
the rights 
and freedoms .contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be pre
ferred to 
any other meaning. 
7. A TTORNEY-G.ENER.\L TO REPORT TOP ARLJAlVIENT WHERE BILL A.P.PEARS
 
TO BE INCONS1STENT-W1TH BILL OF RIGHTS--
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the 
Attorney-General shall,--
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the
 Bill,--
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in t
he Bill 
that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms cont
ained in 
this Bill of Rights. 
PART II -- CIVlL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
LIFE AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON 
8. RIGHT NOT TO BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE-
No one shall be deprived of life except on such grounds as are established
 by law 
and are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. 
9. RIGHT NOT TO BE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE OR CRUELTREATMENT
-
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degradin
g, or 
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. 
10. RIGHT NOT TO RE SUBJECTED TO MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC 
EXPERll\tlENTA TI ON--
Every person has the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific 
experimentation without that person's consent . 
.1.1. RIGHT TO REFUSE TO UNDERGO l\tlEDICAL TREATl\llENT--
Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment. 
DEM.OCRATIC AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
12. ELECTORAL RIGHTS--
Every New Zealand citizen who is of or over the age of 18 years--
(a) Has the right to vote in genuine periodic elections of members of the House 
of Representatives, which elections shall be by equal suffrage and by 
secret ballot; and 
(b) Is qualified for membership of the House of Representatives. 
13. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, Al'W RELIGION-
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, 
including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference . 
.14. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION--
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
15. :MANIFESTATION OF RELIGION AND B.ELIEF--
Every person has the right to manifest that person's religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, 
and either in public or in private. 
16. FREEDOl\1 OF .PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY--
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 
17. FREEDO~I OF ASSOCIATION--
Everyone has the right to freedom of association . 
.1.8. FREEDOl\'.1 OF lVIOVEl\tlENT--
(1) Everyone lawfully in New Zealand has the right to freedom of movement and 
residence in New Zealand. 
(2) Every New Zealand citizen has the right to enter New Zealand. 
(3) Everyone has the right to leave New Zealand. 
(4) No one who is not a New Zealand citizen and who is lawfully in New Zealand 
shall be required to leave New Zealand except under a decision taken on grounds 
prescribed by law. 
NON-DISCRIMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
[19. FREEDOM FR01\'l DISCRI.l\tlINATION-
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
(2) Measures taken in good faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons 
or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination that is unlawful by 
virtue of Part II of the Human Rights Act 1993 do not constitute discrimination.] 
20. RIGHTS OF lVIINORITIES--
A person who belongs to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority in New 
Zealand shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of that 
minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and practise the religion, or to use the 
language, of that minority. 
SEARCH, ARREST, AND DETENTION 
21. UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE--
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, 
whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise. 
22. LIBERTY OF THE PERSON--
Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained. 
23. RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED OR DETAINED--
(1) Everyone who is arrested or who is detained under any enactment--
(a) Shall be informed at the time of the arrest or detention of the reason for it; 
and . 
(b) Shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to be 
informed of that right; and 
(c) Shall have the right to have the validity of the arrest or detention 
determined without delay by way of habeas corpus and to be released if 
the arrest or detention is not lawful. 
(2) Everyone who is arrested for an offence has the right to be charged promptly or 
to be released. 
(3) Everyone who is arrested for an offence and is not released shall be brought as 
soon as possible before a court or competent tribunal. 
( 4) Everyone who is--
(a) Arrested; or 
(b) Detained under any enactment--
for any offence or suspected offence shall have the right to refrain from making 
any statement and to be informed of that right. 
(5) Everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect 
for the inherent dignity of the person. 
24. RIGHTS OF PERSONS CHARGED--
Everyone who is charged with an offence--
(a) Shall be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the 
charge; and 
(b) Shall be released on reasonable terms and conditions unless there ' is just 
cause for continued detention; and 
(c) Shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer; and 
(d) Shall have the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; and 
(e) Shall have the right, except in the case of an offence under military law 
tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of a trial by jury when the 
penalty for the offence is or includes imprisonment for more than 3 
months; and 
(f) Shall have the right to receive legal assistance without cost if the interests of 
justice so require and the person does not have sufficient means to 
provide for that assistance; and 
(g) Shall have the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if the 
person cannot understand or speak the language used in court. 
25. lVIINil\fUl\'1 STAI'."DARDS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of 
the charge, the following minimum rights: , 
(a) The right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
court: 
(b) The right to be tried without undue delay: 
(c) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law: 
(d) The right not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt: 
(e) The right to be present at the trial and to present a defence: 
(f) The right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses for the defence under the same 
conditions as the prosecution: 
(g) The right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been 
varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the 
benefit of the lesser penalty: 
(h) The right, if convicted of the offence, to appeal according to law to a higher 
court against the conviction or against the sentence or against both: 
(i) The right, in the case of a child, to be dealt with in a manner that takes 
account of the child's age. 
26. RETROACTIVE P.ENALTIES AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY-
(1) No one shall be liable to conviction of any offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute an offence by such person under the law of New 
Zealand at the time it occurred. 
(2) No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an 
offence shall be tried or punished for it again. 
27. RIGHT TO JUSTICE--
(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice 
by any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to make a 
determination in respect of that person's rights, obligations, or interests protected 
or recognised by law. 
(2) Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by 
law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public 
authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that 
determination. 
(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend civil 
proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, 
according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings between individuals. 
PART III -- MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
28. OTHER RIGHTS Al~D FREEDOJ.\IJS NOT AFFECTED--
An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or restricted by 
reason only that the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is 
included only in part. 
29. APPLICATION TO LEGAL PERSONS--
Except where the provisions of this Bill of Rights otherwise provide, the provisions 
of this Bill of Rights apply, so far as practicable, for the benefit of all legal persons 
as well as for the benefit of all natural persons. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is administered in the Department of Justice. 
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